

# SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS ON SYMMETRIC KEY PRIMITIVES

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# Abstract

## Side Channel Attacks on Symmetric Key Primitives

Yaser Esmaeili Salehani

Cryptographic primitives, including symmetric key encryption algorithms, are the basic building blocks of security systems. Cryptanalytic attacks against these algorithms can be divided into two classes: pure mathematical attacks and side channel attacks. Pure mathematical attacks are traditional cryptanalytic techniques that rely only on known or chosen input-output pairs of the encryption function, and exploit the inner structure of the cipher to reveal secret key information. In side channel attacks, the physical implementation of the cryptographic algorithms is considered. In particular, in this class of attacks, it is assumed that the attacker has some access to the cryptographic device and is able to make measurements with respect to time or power consumption, or is able to induce errors in the memory or operation of the device. The additional information gained by utilizing such a side channel are then combined with methods that exploit the inner structure of the cipher to reveal the secret key. The wide spread of unprotected software or hardware cryptographic implementations can offer various possibilities for these side channel attacks. Throughout this thesis, we present side channel cryptanalysis against three symmetric key ciphers.

First, we present a differential fault analysis of SOSEMANUK which is a software-based stream cipher that supports a variable key length between 128 and 256 bits and a 128-bit

initial value. SOSEMANUK has passed all three stages of the ECRYPT stream cipher project and is a member of the eSTREAM software portfolio. We analyze the cipher utilizing the fault model in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random inner state word but cannot control the exact injected fault locations. Our attack, which recovers the secret inner state of the cipher, requires around 6144 faults, work equivalent to around  $2^{48}$  SOSEMANUK iterations and a storage of around  $2^{38.17}$  bytes.

Next, we present a differential fault analysis against Hummingbird. Hummingbird is a lightweight encryption algorithm that has a hybrid structure of block cipher and stream cipher with 16-bit block size, 256-bit key size, and 80-bit internal state. We analyze the cipher utilizing the fault model in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random word before the linear transform, after the s-boxes, of the four block ciphers which are used in the Hummingbird encryption process but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. Our attack, which recovers the 256-bit key, requires around 50 faults and  $2^{66}$  steps.

ZUC is a new stream cipher that was proposed for the 4G mobile standard by the Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Our third contribution is a scan based cryptanalysis of ZUC. A scan path connects registers in a hardware circuit serially so that a tester can observe the register values inside the circuit. Scan-based attacks exploit the scan chains that are inserted into the devices for the purpose of testing. Under reasonable assumptions, our scan-based cryptanalysis allows the attacker to ascertain the whole location of internal registers including the LFSR and the memory cells of the cipher. The attack, which utilizes the key loading procedure and the working mode of the cipher execution procedure, allows the cryptanalyst to recover the

secret internal state of the cipher in a relatively small number of clock cycles.

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# List of Acronyms

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| AES     | Advanced Encryption Standard                                  |
| CRT     | Chinese Remainder Theorem                                     |
| DES     | Data Encryption Standard                                      |
| DFA     | Differential Fault Analysis                                   |
| DFT     | Design For Testability  |
| DPA     | Differential Power Analysis                                   |
| ECC     | Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems                                  |
| ECRYPT  | European Network of Excellence for Cryptology                 |
| EDC     | Error Detecting Codes   |
| eSTREAM | ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project                                  |
| FSM     | Finite State Machine  |
| GE      | Gate Equivalent   |
| LFSR    | Linear Feedback Shift Register                                |
| LTE     | Long Term Evolution   |
| MAC     | Message Authentication Code                                   |
| NESSIE  | New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption |

|      |  |
|------|--|
| NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
| NLCG | Non-Linear Combiner Generator                  |
| NLFF | Non-Linear Filter Function                     |
| RBT  | Redundancy Based Techniques                    |
| RFID | Radio Frequency Identification                 |
| SHA  | Secure Hash Algorithm                          |
| SPA  | Simple Power Analysis                          |
| SPN  | Substitution Permutation Network               |
| TEA  | Tiny Encryption Algorithm                      |

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Protection and hiding of valuable information has a very old history [1] where cryptology has developed over the centuries from an art, in which only few were ingenious, into a science with well established foundations. There are several goals which security professionals desire to achieve through the use of cryptography. These goals include confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, non-repudiation and data origin authentication [2]. Cryptology encompasses two related fields: cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptography can be defined as the study of mathematical techniques to ensure various aspects of information security as those mentioned. On the other hand, cryptanalysis can be defined as the study of techniques to analyze, and break, information security services by targeting, specifically, the underlying cryptographic algorithms.

Cryptographic primitives, which can be seen as the basic building blocks of any cryptosystem, are extremely important in the view of cryptographers and attackers. While cryptographers design cryptosystems using these low-level building blocks, attackers attempt

to evaluate such blocks in order to compromise the overall security of deployed systems. Block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions, message authentication codes and public key cryptosystems are among the most fundamental primitives of cryptography.

Cryptographic algorithms can be divided into two basic classes: symmetric key (or secret key) systems and asymmetric key (or public key) systems. Both of these systems are used to provide a variety of security functions for networks and information systems. Whereas symmetric key cryptography uses the same key for encrypting and decrypting information, public key algorithms do not require a secure initial exchange of one or more secret keys between the sender and receiver. In symmetric key cryptography, confidentiality is provided by using stream ciphers or block ciphers. While stream ciphers encrypt the bits of the message one at a time, block ciphers take a number of bits and encrypt them as block units under a private key. The focus of this work is the cryptanalysis of symmetric key primitives.

## **1.1 Motivation**

Generally, cryptanalysis of a cipher, or simply cipher breaking, does not mean finding an efficient algorithm for an adversary to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext. In particular, in the academic cryptanalysis literature, breaking a cipher mainly means finding a weakness in the cipher that can be exploited with a complexity strictly less than brute force. In other words, the cryptosystem is said to be broken if the effort required by the attacker to gain the secret information (e.g., plaintext or key) is less than the effort needed

by naive exhaustive key search. Based on this definition, which can be controversial, one may need unrealistic amounts of time, memory, or known/chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In fact, most of the published pure mathematical attacks against modern ciphers belong to this category, i.e., these attacks require an unrealistic amount of resources.

However, in many practical scenarios, the adversary may have access to the cryptographic device. In such a case, side channel attacks allow the attackers to practically break these cryptosystems using relatively small amount of computational resources and a small number of known/chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In particular, side channel attacks make use of the physical implementation of the cryptosystem and cover different models which increase the capabilities of the attackers. These capabilities include gaining side channel information about the encryption or decryption process such as timing analysis [3] and power analysis [4]. It may also include the ability to apply some kind of influence on the internal state of the cryptographic devices by using unsupported supply voltage or excessively overclocking the device. Strong electric or magnetic fields, or even ionizing radiation flipping random bit(s) in the internal registers of the hardware implementation may also be used to gain access to some faulty computations of the cryptographic devices which allow the recovery of secret internal information [5].

Currently, the wide spread of unprotected software or hardware cryptographic implementations offer various possibilities for these side channel attacks. Such attacks are practical and do not require expensive equipments. One class of side channel attacks that we will focus on throughout this work is differential fault analysis (DFA) [6]. DFA is a powerful



side channel attack which can be applied to various kinds of cryptographic devices including public key systems, block ciphers and stream ciphers. The basic idea behind DFA is to force the cryptographic device to produce some controlled incorrect output results which allow the attacker to deduce information about the secret internal state of the cryptographic device. This technique was first applied to RSA [6] and then generalized to other public key ciphers [6] and block ciphers such as DES [7] and AES [8]. Later on, DFA was also applied to stream ciphers [9], particularly against the finalist list of the eStream project including HC-128 [10] and Rabbit [11, 12].

In the first part of this work, we present a differential fault analysis on SOSEMANUK, which is a software-based stream cipher that has passed all three stages of the ECRYPT stream cipher project and is a member of the eSTREAM software portfolio.

Recently, dedicated ultra-lightweight symmetric key algorithms have been proposed for applications within low-cost resource constrained devices such as RFID tags, smart cards, and wireless sensor nodes. Obviously, security and privacy challenges should be considered in these devices as well. In particular, DFA technique is still one of the main cryptanalysis techniques that can be utilized to break these cryptographic devices. Consequently, in the second part of this work, we apply DFA to cryptanalyze a relatively new lightweight encryption algorithm, Hummingbird, proposed by Engels *et al.* at FC'10 [13].

Design for testability (DFT) is a technique which has drastically improved the manufacturing testing with an efficient method of yielding a high fault coverage. Although the scan test causes DFT to be more successful, it can also be applied to assist attackers launch non-invasive attacks, which exploit information that is unintentionally leaked externally,

to recover important secret information from the cryptographic device. In general, this method can be applied to various kinds of cryptographic algorithms that are implemented in hardware. In the last part of this thesis, we present a scan-based cryptanalysis against a hardware implementation of the new stream cipher ZUC which was recently proposed for inclusion in the 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) mobile standard [14, 15].

## 1.2 Contributions of the thesis

Our contributions can be summarized as follows:

- **Differential Fault Analysis of SOSEMANUK:** SOSEMANUK [16] is a software-based stream cipher which supports a variable key length between 128 and 256 bits and a 128-bit initial value. It has passed all three stages of the ECRYPT stream cipher project and is a member of the eSTREAM software portfolio. Our first contribution is a fault analysis attack on SOSEMANUK. The fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random inner state word but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. Our attack, which recovers the secret inner state of the cipher, requires around 6144 faults, work equivalent to around  $2^{48}$  SOSEMANUK iterations and a storage of around  $2^{38.17}$  bytes.
- **Differential Fault Analysis of Hummingbird:** Hummingbird [13, 17] is a lightweight encryption algorithm proposed by Engels *et al.* at FC'10. Unlike other lightweight cryptographic primitives, which can be classified as either block ciphers or stream ciphers, Hummingbird has a hybrid structure of block cipher and stream cipher with

16-bit block size, 256-bit key size, and 80-bit internal state. Preliminary analysis conducted by the cipher’s designers shows that it is resistant to most common attacks against block ciphers and stream ciphers. Our second contribution is a differential fault analysis attack on Hummingbird. The fault model in which we analyze the cipher, is the one where the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random word before the linear transform, after the s-boxes, of the four block ciphers which are used in the Hummingbird encryption process but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. Our attack, which recovers the 256-bit key, requires around 50 faults and  $2^{66}$  steps.

- **Scan Based Side Channel Attack of ZUC:** ZUC [14, 15] is a relatively new stream cipher that was proposed for the 4G mobile standard by the Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Our third contribution is a scan based cryptanalysis against ZUC. Under reasonable assumptions, our cryptanalysis allows the attacker to ascertain the whole location of internal registers of the LFSR and the memory cells.

The above results are partially published in [18] and [19].

## 1.3 Thesis Outline

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter introduces the required background and the literature review of the side channel attacks. Our differential fault analysis of SOSEMANUK is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 includes our differential fault

analysis of Hummingbird. The scan based cryptanalysis of ZUC is presented in chapter 5.

Finally, chapter 6 provides the conclusions and future work.

## **Chapter 2**

# **Cryptanalysis of Symmetric Key**

## **Encryption Algorithms**

Symmetric key encryption algorithms can be classified as either block ciphers or stream ciphers. In this chapter, we first provide a brief introduction to block ciphers and stream ciphers. We then present an overview of different cryptanalytic attacks against these ciphers.

### **2.1 Block ciphers**

Symmetric key block ciphers are among the most prominent elements in modern cryptography. As a fundamental building block, their versatility allows the construction of pseudo random number generators, stream ciphers, MACs, and hash functions [2]. Individually, they provide confidentiality under a secret parameter called private key or secret key.

Block ciphers operate on fixed length groups of bits, called blocks, typically of sizes

ranging between 64 to 256 bits. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) [20], which was developed in the 1970s by IBM, is an example for a symmetric key block cipher which encrypts 64-bit data blocks under the control of a 56-bit key. The DES decryption is the inverse of DES encryption and uses the same key. In 2001, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [21], with a 128-bit block length and 128-256 bit key length, was approved by NIST as a replacement for DES.

Block ciphers are constructed by combining basic building blocks which consist mainly of linear transformations or permutations, non-linear functions such as s-boxes, and modular addition. Usually, these building blocks are combined in units called rounds. The Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) structures and Feistel (also referred to as DES-like) structures are the two most commonly used designs for block cipher constructions [2].

### **2.1.1 Resource constrained block ciphers**

Due to the tight cost and constrained resources of high volume consumer devices such as RFID tags, smart cards and wireless sensor networks, it is desirable to employ lightweight and specialized cryptographic primitives for many security applications. Several resource constrained devices have limited capabilities in every aspect of computation, communication and storage. To secure these devices, lightweight cryptographic primitives are needed.

The gate constraints for security of low-cost tags are about 200-2000 gates which is less than what is usually required by standard cryptographic primitives. Thus existing cryptographic algorithms can be hardly implemented under such resource constraints. The

resources required for AES are around 3600 Gate Equivalent (GE). While the exact implementation requirements for the primarily constrained resource algorithms, Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) [22], are not known, a crude estimate is that TEA needs at least 2100 GE and XTEA [23] needs at least 2000 GE. Some of the most extensive proposals for low-cost implementation are mCrypton [24], HIGHT [25], SEA [26], CGEN [27], PRESENT [28], MIBS [29], and Hummingbird [13] (CGEN and Hummingbird are not classified as pure block ciphers). The required gates for the hardware implementation of some of these encryption algorithms are 2949 GE for mCrypton , 3048 GE for HIGHT, 2280 GE for SEA, 1570 GE for PRESENT and 1396 for MIBS.

## **2.2 Stream ciphers**

Stream ciphers provide another alternative for block ciphers in applications requiring symmetric key encryption. Generally, compared to block ciphers, stream ciphers are preferred in software applications with very high throughput requirements, and in hardware applications with restricted resources such as limited storage, gate count, or power consumption.

Stream ciphers can be thought of as pseudorandom number generators that are initialized by secret keys and, usually known, Initial Values (IVs). The encryption process is performed by combining the plaintext with the produced key stream, usually through an XOR operation.

Unlike the case for block ciphers, currently there is no specific standard for stream

ciphers. However, two main projects are worth mentioning. The first one, the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE), is a European research project funded from 2000 to 2003 [30]. At the end of this project, none of the submitted stream ciphers were selected because all of them were attacked. In 2004, a call for another competition of stream ciphers proposals was issued by the Network of Excellence within the Information Societies Technology (IST) Programme of the European Commission [31]. Thirty five stream cipher algorithms were submitted to the project, known as the eSTREAM [32], at three profiles: Profile I (Software), Profile II (Hardware) and Profile I+II (Software+Hardware). In 2008 and after three phases, four algorithms were selected as Profile I and three stream ciphers were announced as Profile II as follows:

- Profile I (SW): HC-128 [33], Rabbit [34], Salsa20/12 [35] and SOSEMANUK [16].
- Profile II (HW): Grain [36], MICKEY [37] and Trivium [38].

Stream ciphers can be classified as synchronous and self-synchronizing or asynchronous. A synchronous stream cipher is one in which the keystream is generated independent of the plaintext message and of the ciphertext. Synchronization requirements, and no error propagation are properties of synchronous stream ciphers. An asynchronous stream cipher is one in which the previous ciphertext digits participate in computing the next keystream word. Consequently, the keystream generated by an asynchronous stream cipher algorithm is a function of the key and a fixed number of previous ciphertext digits. Some properties of asynchronous stream ciphers are self-synchronization, limited error propagation, active attacks and diffusion of plaintext statistics.



Stream ciphers can also be classified with respect to their design components into shift register based and non shift register based stream ciphers. RC4 [39], HC-128 [33] and HC-256 [40] are examples for non shift register based stream ciphers. Shift register based ciphers can be further divided into Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)-based and Non-Linear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR)-based structures. Due to inherent linearity of the output of LFSRs sequences, its direct application in cryptography is restricted although its produced sequences may have several good properties such as long period, balancedness and good correlation properties. To eliminate this inherent linearity in LFSRs based stream ciphers, one can use more than one LFSR and utilize a Non-Linear Combiner Generator (NLCG) to remove the linearity of the produced sequence in a regularly clocked LFSR. The nonlinear combining functions are required to have cryptographic properties such as balance, high nonlinearity, correlation immunity, high algebraic degree and high algebraic immunity degree [42] to ensure that the output of the stream cipher is secure. Another method to improve the nonlinearity of the output sequence is through the use of Non-Linear Filter Function (NLFF) which operates on a subset of the bits of the LFSR. Irregularly clocked LFSRs were also proposed to improve the nonlinearity of stream ciphers [41]. In this case, the underlying structure has more than one LFSR where each of them is clocked at a different rate, independent of the others, at each step of the cipher iterations.

## 2.3 Cryptanalysis of symmetric ciphers

Cryptanalysis is the study of techniques which attempt to defeat information security services by compromising the underlying cryptographic schemes. Cryptanalysis of symmetric key ciphers typically involves looking for attacks against block ciphers, stream ciphers and MACs. There is a wide variety of cryptanalytic attacks and they can be classified by several ways.

Based on the nature of the adversary, cryptanalytic techniques can be classified into either passive attacks or active attacks. A passive attack is one where the adversary only monitors the communication channel which only threatens the data confidentiality. On the other hand, in an active attack, the attacker may attempt to delete, add, or change the transmission on the channel. Data integrity, authentication and confidentiality are threatened by this type of adversaries.

Another classification is based on the information available to the adversary. In this case, cryptanalytic attacks can be classified as ciphertext-only attacks, known-plaintext attacks, chosen-plaintext attacks, chosen-ciphertext attack, adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks and adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks [2]. In a ciphertext-only attack, the cryptanalyst has access only to the ciphertext and tries to recover the key or plaintext whereas in a known-plaintext attack, the cryptanalyst has access to a ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext. A chosen-plaintext attack is a cryptanalysis form in which the adversary may

choose a plaintext and learn its corresponding ciphertext while in a chosen-ciphertext attack, the attacker can choose ciphertexts and learn their corresponding plaintexts. In adaptive chosen-plaintext attack, the cryptanalyst makes a series of interactive queries, choosing subsequent plaintexts based on the information from the previous encryptions. Finally, an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack is an interactive model of chosen-ciphertext attacks in which an attacker sends a number of ciphertexts to be decrypted, then uses the results of these decryptions to select subsequent ciphertexts.

There is another classification of attacks with respect to whether the attacker has some sort of physical access to the encrypting device or not. Pure mathematical attacks are traditional cryptanalytic techniques that rely only on known or chosen input-output pairs of the encryption function, and exploit the inner structure of the cipher to reveal secret key information. On the contrary, in side channel attacks, it is assumed that the attacker has some access to the encryption device, either by being able to make measurements with respect to time or power consumption, or by being able to induce errors in the memory of the device (fault analysis). The additional information gained by utilizing such a side channel is then combined with methods that exploit the inner structure of the cipher to reveal the secret key.

The success of a cryptanalytic attack is typically measured by the following complexities:

- *Data complexity*: The amount of plaintext/ciphertext information necessary to perform the attack.

- *Time complexity*: The amount of necessary computations required to execute the attack. For example, in the case of a brute force attack in which every key is trivially examined, the number of operations is  $2^{|K|-1}$  on average, where  $|K|$  denotes the size of the key space in bits.
- *Memory complexity*: The amount of storage required by the algorithm that executes the attack.
- *Number of necessary physical actions on the encrypting device*: This measure is relevant only to side channel attacks and can include the number of necessary measurements in case of side channel analysis (such as power analysis attacks and timing attacks) or number of induced faults in the memory of the cipher, in case of fault analysis.

### **2.3.1 Pure mathematical attacks of symmetric ciphers**

In pure mathematical attacks, the adversary regards the problem as how to recover the secret key given input/output pairs of the encryption algorithm from a purely mathematical perspective without considering the physical implementation of the cipher.

There are various types of pure mathematical cryptanalysis models against symmetric key ciphers. However, a set of generic cryptanalytic methods exists regardless whether the cryptographic algorithm is a stream cipher or a block cipher. Brute force or exhaustive key

search is the most trivial generic cryptanalytic method which can be applied to such algorithms, independent of the design details. Besides, many other cryptanalytic methods investigate weaknesses of symmetric algorithms. In what follows, the intuition behind some of the well-known cryptanalysis methods which are applicable to symmetric primitives is given.

*Linear cryptanalysis* [43] is a known plaintext attack that utilizes the existence of any linear relation, between some plaintext and ciphertext bits, that holds with probability different than  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Linear cryptanalysis was successfully applied by Matsui against DES in 1993. Later on, the attack was widely applied to many other block ciphers with different degrees of success. The first step of linear cryptanalysis is to obtain a linear approximation for the nonlinear blocks (e.g., s-boxes or non-linear combining functions). In this step, the attacker utilizes approximations that hold with a large bias. The second step is to propagate the achieved approximation throughout the other component of the cipher in order to achieve an overall probabilistic linear relation that involves the plaintext, ciphertext and the key bits (as the only unknowns).

*Differential cryptanalysis* [44] is a general cryptanalytic method applicable primarily to block ciphers, but was also applied recently to stream ciphers. In a very broad sense, differential cryptanalysis studies how specific differences in the input of a particular transformation affect the resulting output differences. As in linear cryptanalysis, the first step of differential cryptanalysis is to find differential characteristics that hold with relatively good probability for the different building blocks of the cipher. Then, these characteristics are concatenated to form a differential for the overall cipher. Consequently, possible key

values can be recovered from the desired output difference between two chosen or known plaintext inputs.

Truncated differential cryptanalysis [45], impossible differential attacks [46], higher-order differential cryptanalysis [47], and Boomerang attacks [48] are some well known extensions of differential cryptanalysis.

Other attacks on block ciphers, independent of linear and differential cryptanalysis, include the interpolation attacks [49], related key attacks [50], square attacks, integral attacks, and multiset attacks [51,52]. Examples of dedicated cryptanalysis techniques against stream ciphers include the correlation attacks [53] and the guess and determine attacks [54].

For modern stream and block ciphers, the above examples of pure mathematical attacks are interesting, mainly, from a theoretical perspective but they typically require an overwhelming computation and/or data complexity.

### **2.3.2 Side channel attacks**

Side channel attacks concentrate on how to utilize the information leaked from physical implementations of cryptographic modules during execution of the algorithm. Implementation dependent attacks, i.e., side channel attacks, present a serious threat for many applications of symmetric key primitives which are widely deployed in many devices such as TV set-top boxes, prepaid cards and smart cards.

In the side channel attacks, the cryptanalyst is assumed to have some physical access to the particular device that performs the encryption. Certain parameters such as the instantaneous power consumption of the cryptographic device or the time used to perform

the encryption operation can be measured. In some of these attacks, the attacker is also assumed to be able to induce errors in the memory of the device or at a particular step of the computation process of the device (fault analysis). In other words, the leakage of information can be extracted by analyzing timing measurements, power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. Besides, other forms of side channel information can be available as a result of hardware or software failures which can be cleverly introduced into the cryptographic device by changing the operating frequency or temperature beyond the allowed limits or by other dedicated methods of fault injection. By utilizing this side channel information, the attacker might be able to deduce some information about the encrypting process which leads to recovering the key.

Anderson *et al.* [55] categorize side channel attacks into the following four classes:

- *Invasive Attacks*: These attacks require a direct physical access to the internal elements of the cryptographic modules. For instance, the attacker may reach the layer of the cryptographic module and put a microprobing needle on a data bus to record, and later analyze, the data transfer. Several defensive measures are usually implemented in hardware to efficiently limit invasive attacks. For example, if tampering is detected, some cryptographic modules with higher security level reset all their memories [56].
- *Semi-invasive Attacks*: In these attacks, the adversary can access the device but without inducing a physical damage to the chip or making unauthorized electrical interface connection. For example, in fault analysis attacks, the attacker may utilize a

laser beam to ionize the device to change some of its memory data and finally alter the device output [5].

- *Local non-invasive Attacks*: In this class of attacks, the cryptanalyst needs close investigation or manipulation of the device's operation. For example, from the power analysis point of view, the attacker can observe the current drawn by the processor precisely. Then, the cryptographic keys can be recovered by means of measuring the correlation of the mentioned parameter with the computations being performed by the device.
- *Remote attacks*: These attacks require only observation or manipulation of the device's normal input and output. There are various types of attack that are independent of the distance between the attacker and the cryptographic device. Timing analysis, protocol analysis and attacks on application programming interfaces belong to this group.

Each of these types of attacks may also be classified as passive or active depending on assumptions regarding the control executed by the attacker over the computation process. In passive attacks, the normal operations of the device are not affected, i.e., the adversary can collect information about the operation of the target system without disturbing its normal task. In active attacks, the attacker can interfere with the device inputs or environment to change the normal operation while the target system may or may not be able to detect such an influence.

Among various kinds of side channel attacks, timing attacks [3], power analysis attacks



[4] and fault attacks [6] are the three most well-known and widely studied attacks. Other types of side channel attacks include electromagnetic attacks [57,58], acoustic attacks [59] and cold boot attacks [60,61].

Timing attacks, introduced in 1996 by Kocher [3] against RSA, are the first type of modern side channel attacks presented in the open academic literature. The basic idea of the timing attack comes from the fact that typical implementations of cryptographic algorithms execute the computations in a non-fixed time. Whenever these operations involve secret parameters, they should be considered as a potential risk because these timing variations can leak some useful information about the secret parameters. By careful study of the obtained timing statistics, one can recover these secret parameters. A common method to prevent timing attacks is that all operations should be designed to take the same time duration. In case this is not achievable, some rough timing disturbance can be applied by introducing random timing shifts and wait states or by adding dummy instructions. To increase the number of ciphertexts required by the adversary, random delays can be added to the processing time. Generally, the number of required samples increases approximately as the square of the timing noise [3].

Power analysis attacks are another powerful form of side channel attacks which utilize the correlation between the power consumption of cryptographic devices and the secret parameters used in the cryptographic computations performed by these devices. These attacks, which were proposed in 1998 by Kocher *et al.* [4], can non-invasively extract secret information, such as cryptographic keys, from the device by measuring the instantaneous

power consumption from the running cryptographic operations that involve the desired secret parameters. Unlike the timing analysis, power analysis attacks are mainly applicable to hardware implementations. There are two general types of power analysis attack: Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). In SPA attacks, the attacker tries to guess which particular instruction is being carried out at a specific time from the measured power traces as well as the input and output values of this instruction. In contrast to SPA, DPA is a more advanced form of power analysis that needs no knowledge of implementation details. In DPA attacks, the adversary computes the intermediate values within cryptographic computations by statistically analyzing data collected from multiple cryptographic operations. To alleviate power analysis attacks, one can modify the design of the hardware device to randomize its power consumption or to equalize the power consumption of all operations to make it independent of the processed secret values. Another commonly used countermeasure method against power analysis attacks is the data masking technique, which can be applied at the software or hardware level [62, 63].

In fault analysis attacks, the cryptanalyst applies some kinds of physical influence, such as ionizing radiation, on the internal state of the cryptosystem which influence the cryptographic primitive execution or memory. By carefully studying the results of computations performed under such faults, the attacker can retrieve information about the secret key. In 1996, Boneh *et al.* [6] introduced fault analysis by describing an attack that targets the RSA public key cryptosystem and exploits a faulty Chinese Remainder Theorem computation to factor the modulus  $n$ . Subsequently, fault analysis attacks were extended to symmetric

systems such as DES [7] and later to AES [8]. Fault analysis attacks became a more serious threat after cheap and low-tech methods of applying faults were presented [5]. Fault attacks against stream ciphers were introduced by Hoch *et al* [9], where attacks against LILI-128 and SOBER-t32 and RC4 were described. Other stream ciphers that were analyzed in the fault analysis model include SNOW 3G [64], Trivium [65], HC-128 [10] and Rabbit [11, 12].

The number of required faults in the above fault attacks varies depending on the assumed fault analysis model. In general, all models follow the one given in Armknecht *et al.* [66], which assumes that the attacker has access to the physical device, and that the attacker is able to reset the device to the same unknown initial settings as often as needed. However, different assumptions with respect to the amount of control the attacker has over the induced faults are utilized. For example, the attacker may have control over the location of the faulted memory register, or may be able to restrict the Hamming weight of the induced faults. For instance, Biham *et al.* [67] assumed a model in which the attacker can choose the exact location (register) of the fault which causes RC4 to enter a special inner state and makes its recovery a trivial task. Similarly, Armknecht *et al.* [66] described a fault analysis attack against SNOW 2.0 where they assumed that the fault occurs exactly in a particular register of the cipher. On the other hand, in the fault analysis of Trivium [65], it is assumed that the attacker has no control or knowledge over the fault position. Different assumptions also exist regarding the Hamming weight of induced faults. For instance, in [10], it is assumed that the fault causes a 1-bit flip in the inner state of the cipher, whereas in [67], it is assumed that the fault is localized in one byte of the inner state.

Fault analysis attacks have also been applied to several block ciphers [7, 68–70]. The basic idea of the differential fault attack against SPN-based block ciphers is to use the diffusion property of the last linear transformation layer in order to determine whether the difference before the last nonlinear layer possibly originates in a fault or not. In particular, the adversary induces a fault as a differential input of the last linear transform and looks at the corresponding differential output. This provides the attacker with a distinguishing criteria for the last round key. More details on this class of attacks can be found in [69].

To secure cryptographic devices against fault analysis, proper countermeasures have to be applied. Generally, these countermeasures try to detect any temporal or permanent faults which happen in the cryptosystem, and then, immediately, disable the device output or reset all the output bits to 0s. As a result, the attacker will be prevented from observing the output of the faulty cryptographic computations and hence the vulnerability of the cryptosystem to these attacks can be alleviated. Several approaches of fault detection techniques have been investigated. These techniques include error detecting codes (EDCs) and redundancy-based techniques (RBT) [71, 72].

In addition to the above mentioned side channel attacks and models, another technique, called scan based side channel attack, was recently introduced to recover secret keys from hardware implementation of cryptographic devices that are designed with some built-in testability features. In the proposed model [73], the attacker first locates all the scan elements of the scan chain by scanning out the internal state in the test mode after loading pairs of known plaintexts with one-bit difference in the normal mode. In [73], the secret key was determined by using the structure of the DES s-boxes and three additional plaintexts. This

attack was also applied to stream ciphers [74,75].

The flipped scan technique [76] was proposed to mitigate scan based side channel attacks. In this technique, inverters are introduced at random points in the scan chain. The authors in [76] claimed that the required security is reached when the inverter positions cannot be guessed with a probability significantly greater than  $\frac{1}{2}$ . However, Agrawal *et al.* showed that this technique was vulnerable to the reset attack [74]. To prevent this attack, they also proposed another protection mechanism, called the XOR-chain, in which XOR gates are inserted at random points in the scan chain [74]. In this scheme, each XOR gate acts as a data-dependent inverter which conditionally changes the current input of the flip-flop based on the preceding one. As a result, the new method using XOR chains has been shown to provide a good level of resistance against known scan based attacks without compromising testability [74].

## Chapter 3

# Differential Fault Analysis of SOSEMANUK

### 3.1 Introduction

SOSEMANUK [16] is a fast software-oriented stream cipher that has passed all the three phases of the ECRYPT eSTREAM competition and is currently a member of the eSTREAM Profile 1 (software portfolio). It uses a 128-bit initialization vector and allows keys of either 128-bit or 256-bits, whereas the claimed security is always 128-bits. The design of SOSEMANUK (See Figure 2) is based on the SNOW2.0 stream cipher [77] and utilizes elements of the Serpent block cipher [78]. SOSEMANUK aims to fix weaknesses of the SNOW 2.0 design and achieves better performance, notably in the ciphers initialization phase. Also, the secret inner state of SOSEMANUK is reduced when compared to SNOW 2.0 and amounts to 384 bits.

The preliminary analysis [16], conducted during the SOSEMANUK design process, includes the assessment of the cipher with respect to different cryptanalytic attacks such as correlation attacks, distinguishing attacks and algebraic attacks. Public analysis followed and SOSEMANUK was assessed in [79] by Ahmadi *et al.* where a guess-and-determine attack requiring  $2^{226}$  operations and  $2^4$  keystream words was provided. Another improved guess-and-determine attack was presented by Tsunoo *et al.* in [80]. A correlation attack on SOSEMANUK was presented by Jung-Keun Lee *et al.* [81] with a computational complexity of  $2^{147.88}$  and success probability 99% to recover the initial secret inner state. The data requirement for the attack was relaxed by Cho *et al.* [82]. In 2009, Lin *et al.* [83] improved the guess-and-determine attack, achieving complexity of  $2^4$  word keystream using  $2^{192}$  steps. Another guess-and-determine attack with time complexity  $2^{176}$  was recently presented by Feng *et al.* in Asiacrypt 2010 [84].

In this chapter, we present a fault analysis attack on SOSEMANUK. The fault analysis model adopted in the chapter is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able corrupt a random inner state register in between the iterations of the cipher but the attacker has no control or knowledge over which inner state register has been corrupted. Also, the attacker is assumed to be able to reinitialize the cipher with the same key and IV arbitrary number of times. The attack recovers the secret inner state without recovering the key and requires about 6144 faults,  $2^{48}$  operations each equivalent to one SOSEMANUK iteration and the storage of about  $2^{38.17}$  bytes.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of fault analysis attacks. In section 3.2, relevant details of SOSEMANUK are

reviewed. An overview of the proposed attack is provided in section 3.3. Details of the attack are described in section 3.4 and section 3.5. Finally, the conclusion is given in section 5.5.

## 3.2 The SOSEMANUK specifications

The following notation will be utilized throughout the rest of the chapter:

- $x^i$ :  $i$ -th bit of an  $n$ -bit word  $x$
- $\boxplus, \times$  : addition and multiplication modulo  $2^{32}$ , respectively
- $\oplus$  : bit-wise XOR
- $\lll$  : left rotation defined on 32 bit values
- $|$  :concatenation
- $X_i = f_{t+3}^i | f_{t+2}^i | f_{t+1}^i | f_t^i$ : input value for  $i$ -th s-box applied in the Serpent1 function at some step  $t$  (the  $t$  value will be clear from the context). The Serpent1 function, shown in Figure 1, is defined by 32 applications of  $S$  in the bit-slice mode, where

$$S = [8, 6, 7, 9, 3, 12, 10, 15, 13, 1, 14, 4, 0, 11, 5, 2]$$

is the s-box used in the third s-box layer of the Serpent block cipher [78].

- $'$ : Sign for denoting faulty cipher registers or output. For example  $s'_0$  will denote the LFSR register  $s_0$  in the faulty instance of the cipher.






Figure 1: The Serpent1 function

While the claimed security level of SOSEMANUK is 128 bits, it supports a variable key length of 128 or 256 bits and 128 bit initialization value. As depicted in Figure 2, the secret inner state of SOSEMANUK consists of 12 32-bit words  $(s_0, \dots, s_9, R1, R2)$  and utilizes three main components to generate the keystream output: a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), a finite state machine (FSM) and an s-box-like function, Serpent1. To update the LFSR, the following recurrent relation is applied:

$$s_{t+10} = s_{t+9} \oplus \alpha^{-1} s_{t+3} \oplus \alpha s_t \quad (1)$$

where  $\alpha$  is a root of the primitive polynomial  $P(X) = X^4 + \beta^{23}X^3 + \beta^{245}X^2 + \beta^{48}X + \beta^{239}$  over  $\text{GF}(2^8)$  and  $\beta$  is a root of the primitive polynomial  $Q(X) = X^8 + X^7 + X^5 + X^3 + 1$  over  $\text{GF}(2)$ .




Figure 2: Overview of the SOSEMANUK stream cipher

The FSM update procedure is defined as follows:

$$R1_{t+1} = (R2_t \boxplus mux(lsb(R1_t), s_{t+1}, s_{t+1} \oplus s_{t+8})) \quad (2)$$

$$R2_{t+1} = (Trans(R1_t)) \quad (3)$$

where  $mux(c, x, y) = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } c = 0 \\ y & \text{if } c = 1 \end{cases}$ ,  $Trans(x) = (M \times x) \lll 7$  and  $M = 0x54655307$ .

The FSM output at each step is defined by

$$f_t = (s_{t+9} \boxplus R1_{t+1}) \oplus R2_{t+1} \quad (4)$$

The inner state right after the initialization is denoted by  $(s_0, \dots, s_9, R1_0, R2_0)$ . At each step, first the FSM is updated and the  $f_t$  and  $s_t$  values are preserved in the internal buffer, then the LFSR is updated. Once every four steps, a 128-bit word is generated by

$$z_t|z_{t+1}|z_{t+2}|z_{t+3} = \text{Serpent1}(f_t|f_{t+1}|f_{t+2}|f_{t+3}) \oplus s_t|s_{t+1}|s_{t+2}|s_{t+3}. \quad (5)$$

For a more detailed description of SOSEMANUK, the reader is referred to [16].

### 3.3 The attack overview

In this section, we provide a high level overview of the proposed attack. According to our fault analysis model, the attacker is assumed to be able to re-initialize the cipher an arbitrary number of times. Furthermore, while we assume that each induced fault corrupts only one of the 12 inner state registers, the attacker does not know, and cannot control the position or the new value of the faulted register.

#### 3.3.1 The main idea

The main idea of the attack can be explained as follows. In every SOSEMANUK iteration, 32 s-boxes are applied in the bit-slice mode as a part of the Serpent1 function. The first part of the attack restricts the input for each of the s-boxes by considering faults that occur at  $s_5$  and  $s_4$ . Consider the case where the fault has been injected right after the SOSEMANUK initialization step and that it occurred in the register  $s_5$ . During the next cipher iteration




Figure 3: The  $\Delta f$  values corresponding to the case where  $s_4$  is faulted

in which the  $z_0|z_1|z_2|z_3$  128-bit keystream word is produced, the fault moves in the right-hand direction as the LFSR is clocked for 4 times. In particular, no faulty values participate in generation of  $f_0$ . Furthermore, since in every step, first the FSM is updated and then the  $f_t$  value is computed and finally the LFSR is clocked,  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  are computed without error and the fault affects only  $f_3$ . Now the non-faulty  $f_0, f_1, f_2$  and the faulty  $f_3$  enter the Serpent1 function. In the bit-slice mode, the Serpent1 function applies 32 s-boxes 4-bit inputs, where  $i$ -th bit comes from register  $f_i, i = 0, \dots, 3$  (See Figure 1). Thus, the input difference of all activated s-boxes will be equal to  $0x8$  (1000 in binary). The attacker can then retrieve the corresponding s-box output difference and restrict the set of candidates for the s-box input-output values. When the fault occurs at register  $s_5$ , each s-box output will be faulted with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ , which allows us to establish a criterion to recognize faults in register  $s_5$ . Similarly, in the case where the fault occurs at  $s_4$ , it propagates as shown in Figure 3 potentially affecting only  $f_2$  and  $f_3$ . In other words, only the two most significant bits of every s-box input might be affected. Since a criterion for recognizing faults at  $s_4$  can also be established, observing the output s-box differences for such faults also reduces the set of candidates for the s-box input-output values.

After the candidates for the s-box input-output values have been restricted, equation (5) is used to provide a restriction on the LFSR registers. From (1), it follows that the LFSR registers are not independent and restrictions on the LFSR registers can be coupled with the dependence of the LFSR registers to further prune the candidates for the  $s_t$  values. Finally, a guess and determine attack is used to find the rest of the inner state.

### 3.3.2 The steps of the attack

The attack can be divided into two phases. The first phase collects faulty output in four different steps of the cipher execution and can be summarized as follows:

- For  $l \in \{0, 1, 2, 4\}$ 
  - Repeat the steps below for  $m$  times
    - Reinitialize the cipher
    - Iterate for  $l$  times
    - Induce a fault, corrupting a random inner state register
    - Collect and store the keystream output word  $z'_{4l}|z'_{4l+1}|z'_{4l+2}|z'_{4l+3}$

The second phase, which uses the collected information to uniquely determine the secret inner state, can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Use the faulty outputs gathered in the first phase of the attack for  $l \in \{0, 2, 4\}$  to reduce the number of candidates for  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$ ,  $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$  and  $(s_{16}, s_{17}, s_{18}, s_{19})$  to  $2^{32}$  each. Then, use dependencies between the three fourplets imposed by relation (1) to further reduce the corresponding numbers of candidates (details are explained in section 3.4)
- (2) Similar to the previous step, using the information collected in the first phase of the attack for  $l = 1$ , reduce the number of candidates for  $(s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7)$  to  $2^{32}$  (details are explained in section 3.4)

- (3) Apply the guess-and-determine strategy through the space reduced sets of candidates obtained by previous two steps to recover the complete inner state (details are explained in section 3.5)

In the first phase of attack, data is collected for  $l = 4$  and not for  $l = 3$  since the LFSR registers candidate sets due to  $l = 0$ ,  $l = 2$  and  $l = 4$  are correlated and allow further reduction. The reduction due to  $l = 1$  is used later in the guess-and-determine attack.

### 3.4 Reducing the number of candidates for LFSR registers $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$ and $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$

The starting number of candidates for the LFSR registers  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$  and  $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$  is  $2^{128}$  each. In this section, first we show how to reduce this number to  $2^{32}$  and then, by exploiting the fact that the two register components are linked by relation (1), reduce it further to  $2^{16}$ , each.

#### 3.4.1 Recovering the s-box differences

Let SOSEMANUK be in state  $t = 0$ . From (5) and since  $z_0|z_1|z_2|z_3$  is accessible to the attacker, it is evident that reducing the uncertainty for  $f_0|f_1|f_2|f_3$  leads to reducing the uncertainty of  $s_0|s_1|s_2|s_3$ . In this subsection, the  $f_0|f_1|f_2|f_3$  value is constrained by calculating the s-box input-output differences using the faulty information. Since the algorithms below are also applied to constraint  $f_4|f_5|f_6|f_7$ ,  $f_8|f_9|f_{10}|f_{11}$  and  $f_{16}|f_{17}|f_{18}|f_{19}$ , these algorithms are specified for general time  $t$  and will be used for  $t \in \{0, 4, 8, 16\}$ .

Define  $\delta_i$  and  $\Delta_i$  by

$$\delta_i = S(X_i \oplus 0x8) \oplus S(X_i),$$

$$\Delta_i = \{S(X_i \oplus 0x4) \oplus S(X_i), S(X_i \oplus 0xc) \oplus S(X_i)\}$$

for every  $i = 0, \dots, 31$ . Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, described below, are used to recover  $\delta_i$  and  $\Delta_i$ , respectively, for each  $i = 0, \dots, 31$ .

In what follows, the probability distribution of the number of non-activated s-boxes in the SOSEMANUK output is analyzed. In particular, probabilities of the event that there will be more than 16 non-activated s-boxes are estimated under different assumptions about the location of the fault. For that purpose, let  $0 \leq n \leq 32$  be a random variable which denotes the number of s-boxes that are *not* active in the application of the 32 s-boxes of Serpent1 in some steps of a faulty SOSEMANUK instance. Consider for example the probability that a particular s-box will not be activated given that the fault has occurred at  $s_0$ . In that case, only the 3 most significant bits of the s-box input may be corrupted. Note that, due to (5) by which the corrupted  $s_0$  is XOR-ed to the least significant bits of each s-box, it may also happen that the difference in the s-box output caused by the s-box input cancels out. However, such a possibility has been ruled out by exhaustively checking that for each s-box input value it is not possible to cause a difference only in the least significant bit of the s-box output by any of the differences in the 3 most significant bits of the input. Thus, the probability that the particular s-box has not been activated is  $2^{-3}$ . Now, it is clear that variable  $n \sim B(2^{-3}, 32)$ , i.e.,  $n$  follows binomial distribution with parameters  $p = 2^{-3}$  and



$n = 32$ . According to the binomial distribution,  $P[16 \leq n \leq 31] = \sum_{i=16}^{31} \binom{32}{i} p^i (1-p)^{32-i} \approx 2^{-21}$ . More generally, the distribution of  $n$  in terms of the fault position is given follows:

- $\{s_0\}$ :  $P[16 \leq n \leq 31] \approx 2^{-21}$  as explained above.
- $\{s_1, s_9, R1, R2\}$ : all four s-box input bits may be corrupted. Hence,  $n \sim B(2^{-4}, 32)$ .  
For the fault position  $s_1$ , the possibility of cancelling out the s-box output difference has been ruled out the same way as in the case of  $s_0$ . Using the binomial distribution, it follows that  $P[16 \leq n \leq 31]$  is negligible.
- $\{s_8\}$ : if  $R1_0^0 = 0$ , then,  $n = 0$  with probability 1. Otherwise, all four s-box input bits may be corrupted and  $n \sim B(2^{-4}, 32)$  and as for the previous case,  $P[16 \leq n \leq 31]$  is negligible.
- $\{s_2, s_3\}$ : only the least significant bit will certainly not be corrupted. For  $s_3$ , the cancellation of the s-box output difference is ruled out as in the case of  $s_0$ . In case of  $s_2$ , there exists one s-box input such that the s-box output difference can be cancelled out by inverting the second most significant bit ( $S(1111) = S(1111 \oplus 1110) \oplus 0100$ ). Approximating  $n \sim B(2^{-3}, 32)$  gives  $P[16 \leq n \leq 31] \approx 2^{-21}$ .
- $\{s_4\}$ : the most significant two bits may be corrupted, from which it follows that  $n \sim B(2^{-2}, 32)$ . So,  $P[16 \leq n \leq 31] \approx 0.002$ .
- $\{s_6, s_7\}$ : no s-box input bits can be corrupted and thus  $n = 32$  with probability 1

- $\{s_5\}$ : Only the most significant bit of every s-box input may be corrupted. Thus

$$n \sim B(\frac{1}{2}, 32) \text{ and } P[16 \leq n \leq 31] = \sum_{i=16}^{31} \binom{32}{i} \frac{1}{2^i} \frac{1}{2^{(32-i)}} = 0.569.$$

From the above reasoning, it follows that when the fault does not occur at  $s_5$ ,  $P[16 \leq n \leq 31] \approx \frac{1}{11} \times 0.02 \approx 0.0018$ , where  $\frac{1}{11}$  is the probability that the fault occurred at  $s_4$ , given that it did not occur at  $s_5$ . On the other hand, if the fault occurred at  $s_5$ , the probability of event  $16 \leq n \leq 31$  is equal to 0.569. This analysis indicates that one can decide whether the fault occurred at  $s_5$  or not by verifying whether  $16 \leq n \leq 31$ , or not, respectively.

In Algorithm 1, keystream words for which  $16 \leq n \leq 31$  are considered. Namely, once such a keystream word have been found, the values of *activated* s-boxes are used to learn about the corresponding  $\delta_i$  values. According to the discussion above, if the fault indeed occurred at  $s_5$ , such differences necessarily represent the s-box output difference for the input difference equal to  $0x8$ . To diminish the possibility of false positives (event  $16 \leq n \leq 31$  takes place, but the fault does not occur at  $s_5$ ), the final output difference value is taken as the most frequent difference candidate taken over different faulty keystream words at the (fixed) SOSEMANUK step in question, for which  $16 \leq n \leq 31$  holds.

### Algorithm 1

- Initialize 32 multisets:  $Cand_1(k) = \emptyset, k = 0, \dots, 31$ .
- For each faulty keystream word  $z'_t|z'_{t+1}|z'_{t+2}|z'_{t+3}$ , such that

$$16 \leq \#\{z'_t|z'_{t+1}|z'_{t+2}|z'_{t+3} = z_t^i|z_{t+1}^i|z_{t+2}^i|z_{t+3}^i : i = 0, \dots, 31\} \leq 31 \quad (6)$$

do:

- For each  $0 \leq k \leq 31$ , if  $d = z'_t|z'_{t+1}|z'_{t+2}|z'_{t+3} \oplus z^k_t|z^k_{t+1}|z^k_{t+2}|z^k_{t+3}$  is different than 0, add  $d$  to  $Cand_1(k)$ .
- Return the most frequent element in the multiset  $Cand_1(i)$  as  $\delta_i = S(X_i \oplus 0x8) \oplus S(X_i)$ , for each  $0 \leq i \leq 31$ .

The overall number of required fault injections  $m = 1536$  has been determined by incrementing  $m$  in steps of 128 and experimentally verifying that Algorithm 1 always recovers the correct  $\delta_i = S(X_i \oplus 0x8) \oplus S(X_i)$ ,  $i = 0, \dots, 31$  for 1000 randomly initialized instants of SOSEMANUK.

Algorithm 2 uses  $\delta_i$  recovered by Algorithm 1 to find the sets  $\Delta_i$ ,  $i = 0, \dots, 31$ . In particular, the algorithm recognizes faulty keystream words that correspond to an error in register  $s_4$  and then uses the s-box output differences in such keystream words to deduce  $\Delta_i$  for  $i = 0, \dots, 31$ .

The criterion for recognizing faults in register  $s_4$  is similar to the previously stated criterion for recognizing faults in  $s_5$ . However, instead of asking for 16 or more unactivated s-boxes, we expect to have more than 16 s-boxes which are either unactivated or with output difference equals to  $\delta_i$ . Namely, let  $v$  be the number of s-boxes in one step of SOSEMANUK which are either not activated, or activated by an input difference of  $0x8$ . The probability of the event that one s-box is either not activated, or activated by an input difference of  $0x8$  depends on the location where the fault occurred. In case the error is in register  $s_4$ , the probability in question will be  $\frac{1}{2}$  since in that case only the 2 most significant bits of the

s-box input may be faulted and the input difference has to among  $0x0$ ,  $0x8$ ,  $0xc$  and  $0x4$  values. Thus, if the fault is in  $s_4$ ,  $v \sim B(\frac{1}{2}, 32)$ , and  $P[16 \leq v \leq 31] = 0.569$ . On the other hand, if the fault occurs at some other register, say at  $R1$ , all four s-box input bits may be corrupted and the probability that the input difference will be either  $0x8$  or  $0x0$  is significantly smaller. Again, this gives a methodology to decided whether the fault occurred at  $s_4$  or not by counting the number of s-boxes which reacted with difference of either  $\delta_i$  (using the corresponding  $i$ ) or 0. Once the faults due to an error in register  $s_4$  are recognized, finding the sets  $\Delta_i$  proceeds with the following logic. When a keystream word for which the event  $16 \leq v \leq 31$  took place has been found, the output s-box differences which are not due to input difference of  $0x8$  or  $0x0$  have to be due to difference  $0xc$  or  $0x4$ . Again, to diminish the possibility of false positives (i.e.,  $16 \leq v \leq 31$  but the fault does not occur at  $s_4$ ), the final output set is taken as the set with two most frequent difference candidates for the difference taken over different faulty keystream words at the SOSEMANUK step in question for which  $16 \leq v \leq 31$  holds.

## Algorithm 2

- Initialize 32 multisets:  $Cand_{2,3}(k) = \emptyset$ ,  $k = 0, \dots, 31$ .
- For each faulty keystream output word  $z'_t|z'_{t+1}|z'_{t+2}|z'_{t+3}$ , such that

$$\begin{aligned}
 16 \leq \#\{z'^i_t|z'^i_{t+1}|z'^i_{t+2}|z'^i_{t+3} = z^i_t|z^i_{t+1}|z^i_{t+2}|z^i_{t+3} | i = 0, \dots, 31\} + \\
 \#\{z'^i_t|z'^i_{t+1}|z'^i_{t+2}|z'^i_{t+3} \oplus z^i_t|z^i_{t+1}|z^i_{t+2}|z^i_{t+3} = \delta_i | i = 0, \dots, 31\} \leq 31
 \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

where  $\delta_i$ ,  $0 \leq i \leq 31$  has been recovered by Algorithm 1, do:

- For each  $0 \leq k \leq 31$ , add each  $d = z_t'^k | z_{t+1}'^k | z_{t+2}'^k | z_{t+3}'^k \oplus z_t^k | z_{t+1}^k | z_{t+2}^k | z_{t+3}^k$  such that  $d \notin \{0, \delta_k\}$  to the multiset  $Cand_{2,3}(k)$ .
- Return the two highest occurring elements in the multiset  $Cand_{2,3}(i)$  as the required two-element set  $\Delta_i$ , for each  $i$ .

For the above choice of total number of faults  $m = 1536$ , Algorithm 2 always succeeded in recovering the sets  $\Delta_i$ ,  $i = 0, \dots, 31$ , for 1000 randomly initialized instants of SOSEMANUK.

### 3.4.2 Restricting the number of candidates for the LFSR registers

In each SOSEMANUK step, in which a 128-bit keystream word is produced, according to (5), 32  $4 \times 4$  s-boxes are applied. In the previous subsection, it has been shown how to use the faulty information to deduce the s-box output differences for certain input s-box differences. Naturally, these evaluated input-output differences impose a constraint on the actual input-output values. In this subsection, the sets of possible s-box input-output values are deduced and the effect of the deduced input-output s-box values constraints on the number of candidates for the LFSR registers  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$  is presented.

Having determined the  $\delta_i$  value and the two-element set  $\Delta_i$  by Algorithms 1 and 2, for each  $0 \leq i \leq 31$ , the actual input-output values for the s-box are deduced according to Table 1. As can be noted from the table, in case the s-box input is even, the input-output value can be deduced uniquely. On the other hand, in case when the s-box input value is

| $\delta_i, \Delta_i$ | $i$ -th s-box input | $i$ -th s-box output |
|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 5, {8,B}             | 0                   | 8                    |
| 9, {2,D}             | 2                   | 7                    |
| 3, {B,E}             | 4                   | 3                    |
| F, {4,D}             | 6                   | A                    |
| 5, {D,E}             | 8                   | D                    |
| 9, {4,B}             | A                   | E                    |
| 3, {8,D}             | C                   | 0                    |
| F, {2,B}             | E                   | 5                    |
| 7, {A,D}             | {1,5,9,D}           | {6,C,1,B}            |
| D, {6,B}             | {3,7,B,F}           | {9,F,4,2}            |

Table 1: Determining the s-box input-output values based on sets  $\delta_i$  and  $\Delta_i$

odd, there exist four candidates for the s-box input-output.

Assuming a uniform distribution on the s-box input values, it is expected that the attacker will deduce 64 out of 128 output bits. For the remaining 64 bits, it will be composed out of 16 4-bit values, each restricted to 4 candidates. The overall number of candidates for the 128-bit value  $Serpent1(f_0|f_1|f_2|f_3)$  is then  $4^{16} = 2^{32}$ . Since we have

$$z_0|z_1|z_2|z_3 = Serpent1(f_0|f_1|f_2|f_3) \oplus s_0|s_1|s_2|s_3 \quad (8)$$

and  $z_0|z_1|z_2|z_3$  is known, it follows that there will be  $2^{32}$  candidates for  $s_0|s_1|s_2|s_3$ .

The number of candidates for  $s_4|s_5|s_6|s_7$ ,  $s_8|s_9|s_{10}|s_{11}$  and  $s_{16}|s_{17}|s_{18}|s_{19}$  can be restricted in a similar way. Namely, for that purpose, Algorithms 1 and 2 need to be applied using  $z_4|z_5|z_6|z_7$ ,  $z_8|z_9|z_{10}|z_{11}$  and  $z_{16}|z_{17}|z_{18}|z_{19}$  and the faulty values obtained by the first phase of the attack described in section 3.3 for  $l = 1$ ,  $l = 2$  and  $l = 4$ , respectively. Then, Table 1 is utilized to restrict the s-box input-output values occurring in steps  $t = 1$ ,  $t = 2$  and  $t = 4$ . Following the procedure explained in this section, it follows that  $s_4|s_5|s_6|s_7$ ,

$s_8|s_9|s_{10}|s_{11}$  and  $s_{16}|s_{17}|s_{18}|s_{19}$  are expected to be restricted to  $2^{32}$  candidates each.

### 3.4.3 Further pruning of the LFSR registers candidates

In the previous subsection, the uncertainty for  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$ ,  $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$  and  $(s_{16}, s_{17}, s_{18}, s_{19})$  values has been reduced. In this subsection, we note that these three four-tuples of 32-bit values are not independent. Namely, according to (1), we have  $s_{10} = s_9 \oplus \alpha^{-1}s_3 \oplus \alpha s_0$  and  $s_{18} = s_{17} \oplus \alpha^{-1}s_{11} \oplus \alpha s_8$ . These two relations are used to further prune candidates for  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$  and  $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$ . More precisely, after the end of the process, the attacker is left with  $2^{16}$  candidates for

$$(f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3, s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, f_8, f_9, f_{10}, f_{11}, s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11}) \quad (9)$$

The two relations from the previous paragraph can be rewritten as

$$\alpha^{-1}s_3 \oplus \alpha s_0 = s_{10} \oplus s_9 \quad (10)$$

$$\alpha^{-1}s_{11} \oplus \alpha s_8 = s_{18} \oplus s_{17} \quad (11)$$

Before stating the candidate reduction procedure, we note that the candidates for  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$  are specified in a way which allows listing them in a table efficiently. In particular, the candidate set for  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$  is specified by sets  $B_i, i = 0, \dots, 31$ , such that  $s_0^i|s_1^i|s_2^i|s_3^i \in B_i$ . Then, each element of the set  $B_0 \times B_1 \times \dots \times B_{31}$  specifies one  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$  value. The sets of candidates for  $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$  and  $(s_{16}, s_{17}, s_{18}, s_{19})$  can be transformed to a list in

the same way and this property is used in step (1) and step (5) of the procedure below.

1. List all of the  $(s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3)$  and  $(s_{16}, s_{17}, s_{18}, s_{19})$  candidates and call the two generated tables  $T_1$  and  $T_3$ , respectively. Include also the columns containing  $(f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3)$  and  $(f_{16}, f_{17}, f_{18}, f_{19})$  in  $T_1$  and  $T_3$ , respectively. Create an empty table  $T$ .
2. Extend  $T_1$  by adding a column with the left-hand side of equation (10).
3. Extend  $T_3$  by adding a column with the right-hand side of equation (11).
4. Sort  $T_1$  and  $T_3$  by columns added in steps (2) and (3).
5. For each candidate for  $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$ 
  - 5.1. Calculate the left-hand side of equation (11). If there does not exist an element in  $T_3$  such that (11) holds, go to the next  $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$  candidate (step (5)).
  - 5.2. Otherwise, calculate the right-hand side of equation (10) and find rows of  $T_1$  for which (10) holds. For each such row, add the complete row of the form (9) to table  $T$ .

To find the expected size of table  $T$ , note that it is expected that 16 bits of the  $T_3$  table column containing  $s_{18} \oplus s_{17}$  value are constant, due to the fact that 16 out of 32 s-box inputs corresponding to  $(s_{16}^i, s_{17}^i, s_{18}^i, s_{19}^i)$  have been recovered uniquely by the procedure in the previous subsection. On the other hand, no constant bits are expected to exist in  $\alpha^{-1}s_{11} \oplus \alpha s_8$  values due to randomization resulting from multiplying by  $\alpha$  and  $\alpha^{-1}$ . Thus, about  $2^{16}$  candidates for  $(s_8, s_9, s_{10}, s_{11})$ , with the corresponding  $(f_8, f_9, f_{10}, f_{11})$ , will pass the elimination step (5.1).



In step (5.2), the remaining  $2^{16}$  candidates are joined with  $T_1$ , which contains  $2^{32}$  rows, according to (10). Since there exists no fixed bits in the  $\alpha^{-1}s_3 \oplus \alpha s_0$  column of  $T_1$ , it is expected that around  $2^{16}$  will be present in the output of the join step, i.e., in table  $T$ . Since both  $T_1$  and  $T_3$  contain 9 32-bit words in each row and table  $T$  contains 16 32-bit words in each row, the required memory space for the previous procedure is  $2 \times 2^{32} \times 9 \times 4 + 2^{16} \times 16 \times 4 = 2^{38.17}$  bytes. The computational cost is equal to sorting two tables of  $2^{32}$  rows, executing a search in a sorted table of length  $2^{32}$  for  $2^{32}$  times and finally executing a search for  $2^{16}$  times in the sorted table of  $2^{32}$  entries. By noting that sorting tables of length  $n$  takes  $O(n \log(n))$  steps and that a binary search in the sorted table requires  $O(\log(n))$  steps, the overall cost is about  $2^{32} \times 32 \times 2 + 2^{32} \times 32 + 2^{16} \times 32 = 2^{38.585}$  operations.

### 3.5 Recovering the rest of the inner state

In the previous subsections, we have reduced the LFSR complexity to  $2^{32}$  candidates for  $(s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7)$  and  $2^{16}$  candidates for the registers present in (9). In this subsection, a guess-and-determine like procedure that completes the secret inner state recovery is provided.

Let  $R1_t^0$  denote the least significant bit of register  $R1_t$ . To recover  $s_4, s_5, R1_0$  and  $R2_0$ , the following steps are applied:

- Pick a row from table  $T$  as a guess for (9).
- Determine  $s_4$  from  $s_4 = \alpha(\alpha s_1) \oplus \alpha(s_{10} \oplus s_{11})$  which holds due to (1) since  $s_1, s_{10}$  and  $s_{11}$  are known.
- Guess  $R1_0$  by fixing the register to one of the  $2^{32}$  possible values.

- Determine:

- $R2_0$ , from  $f_0 = (R1_0 \boxplus s_9) \oplus R2_0$
- $R2_1$ , from  $R2_1 = Trans(R1_0)$
- $R1_1$ , from  $R1_1 = R2_0 \boxplus (s_2 \oplus R1_0^0 \cdot s_9)$ , which is another way to formulate (2)
- $R2_2$ , from  $R2_2 = Trans(R1_1)$
- $R1_2$ , from  $R1_2 = R2_1 \boxplus (s_3 \oplus R1_1^0 \cdot s_{10})$ , which follows from (2)
- $R2_3$ , from  $R2_3 = Trans(R1_2)$
- $R1_3$ , from  $R1_3 = R2_2 \boxplus (s_4 \oplus R1_2^0 \cdot s_{11})$ , which follows from (2)
- $s_{12}$ , from  $f_3 = (R1_3 \boxplus s_{12}) \oplus R2_3$
- $s_5$ , from  $s_{12} = s_{11} \oplus \alpha^{-1}s_5 \oplus \alpha s_2$

With a guess for (9) from the first step of the procedure above and having recovered  $s_4$ ,  $s_5$ ,  $R1_0$  and  $R2_0$ , the only left unknown inner state registers are  $s_6$  and  $s_7$ . To recover the remaining two registers, the table of  $2^{32}$  candidates for  $(s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7)$  obtained in section 3.4.2 is matched with newly found value for  $s_4, s_5$ , as follows. Consider the s-box input-output in the second iteration of SOSEMANUK, for which the input-output has not been recovered uniquely. For some  $0 \leq i \leq 31$ ,  $f_7^i|f_6^i|f_5^i|f_4^i$  and consequently,  $S(f_7^i|f_6^i|f_5^i|f_4^i)$  can take 4 values as specified by Table 1. More precisely, rewriting (5) while isolating  $i$ -th s-box

$$z_7^i|z_6^i|z_5^i|z_4^i = S(f_7^i|f_6^i|f_5^i|f_4^i) \oplus s_7^i|s_6^i|s_5^i|s_4^i, \quad (12)$$

we have two options regarding the possible candidates. In other words, from the last two

rows of Table 1, we have either

$$S(f_7^i|f_6^i|f_5^i|f_4^i) \in \{0110, 1100, 0001, 1011\} \quad (13)$$

or

$$S(f_7^i|f_6^i|f_5^i|f_4^i) \in \{1001, 1111, 0100, 0010\}. \quad (14)$$

Moreover, according to the procedure given in this subsection, the value of bits  $s_4^i$ ,  $s_5^i$  has been determined uniquely. Since  $s_4^i$  and  $s_5^i$  are known, according to (12), the two least significant bits of  $S(f_7^i|f_6^i|f_5^i|f_4^i)$  can be determined uniquely. Finally, due to the structure of sets (13) or (14), given information on the two least significant bits, all the 4 bits of  $S(f_7^i|f_6^i|f_5^i|f_4^i)$  are uniquely determined. Presented reasoning uniquely determines the input-output for every s-box, from which, according to (12),  $s_7$  and  $s_6$  are determined uniquely, which completes the recovery of the whole secret inner state.

Now, the found secret inner state can be verified by comparing the actual SOSEMANUK output with the output produced by the recovered inner state. If a difference registered, the next guess for (9) and  $R1_0$  is made and the procedure is repeated.

### 3.6 Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, a differential fault analysis attack on SOSEMANUK was presented. The overall attack complexity can be summarized as follows:

- The average number of faults required to perform the attack is  $4 \times 1536 = 6144$ .

These 1536 transient faults are introduced in steps  $t = 0$ ,  $t = 1$ ,  $t = 2$  and  $t = 4$ .

This fault injection phase requires the attacker to reinitialize the cipher for 6144 times

- The number of operations required for the attack is dominated by the guess-and-determine part of the analysis. Namely, as concluded in section 3.4.3, table  $T$  has  $2^{16}$  rows and thus there exists  $2^{16}$  possible guesses for (9). Since register  $R1_0$  is a 32-bit value, the number of guesses that need to be checked is  $2^{16} \times 2^{32} = 2^{48}$ . Verifying each guess according to the procedure in section 3.5 is equivalent to one SOSEMANUK iteration and thus the attack requires work equivalent to around  $2^{48}$  iterations.
- The storage amount required for the attack is equal to the size of the tables  $T_1$ ,  $T_3$  and  $T$  which amounts to  $2^{38.17}$  bytes.

## **Chapter 4**

# **Differential Fault Analysis of Hummingbird**

### **4.1 Introduction**

Hummingbird [13, 17] is an encryption algorithm designed for lightweight software and lightweight hardware implementations on resource-constrained devices such as RFID tags and wireless sensor nodes. Its design was inspired by the Enigma machine which led to a hybrid combination of block cipher and stream cipher structures.

The security of Hummingbird was evaluated by its designers who concluded that the cipher is resistant to most common attacks against block ciphers and stream ciphers including birthday attacks, differential and linear cryptanalysis, structure attacks, algebraic attacks, and cube attacks. Also a chosen-IV and chosen-message attack was reported by Saarinen [85].

In this chapter, we present a differential fault analysis attack on Hummingbird. The fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to inject a transient fault at a random 4 bit word before the linear transformation, after the  $4 \times 4$  s-boxes, of the four block ciphers which are used in the Hummingbird encryption process but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. We also assume that the attacker is able to reset the cipher an arbitrary number of times.

The main idea of our attack is inspired by recent differential fault analysis attacks against the AES. In these attacks, the attacker collects few differential pairs relative to the last non-linear step which allows the attacker to reduce and finally guess the values computed in the last rounds and infer the last round key. However, unlike the AES case in which once the round key has been recovered, the key schedule can be inverted to obtain the initial secret key, this is not possible for Hummingbird since it does not have an explicit invertible key schedule. Instead, the above procedure has to be reiterated on each round, starting from the last one, until the whole key material is exposed. Our simulation results showed that our attack, which recovers the 256-bit key, requires around 50 fault injections and  $2^{66}$  steps.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. A brief description of the relevant details of Hummingbird is provided in the next section. Our attack and its complexity analysis are provided in section 4.3.

## 4.2 Description of Hummingbird

The following notation and functions are used throughout the chapter:

$\boxplus$  : addition mod  $2^{16}$ .

$\oplus$  : bit-wise XOR.

$\parallel$  : Concatenation of the words.

$\lll$  : left rotation defined on 16-bit value.

$S_i$ : the  $i^{th}$  4-bit s-box where  $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ .

$SBOX$ : the 16-bit nonlinear function which equals to  $S_1 \parallel S_2 \parallel S_3 \parallel S_4$ .

$SBOX^{-1}$ : the inverse mapping of  $SBOX$ .

$L(x)$  : the 16-bit linear transform equation.

$L^{-1}(x)$  : the inverse mapping of  $L(x)$ .

$\Delta X_i$  : the 4-bit differential input of  $S_i$ .

$\Delta Y_i$  : the 4-bit differential input of  $S_i$ .

As mentioned above, Hummingbird has a hybrid structure and consists of two main components: a stream cipher and a block cipher. The input/output block size is 16-bit and the internal state and key size are 80-bit and 256-bit, respectively.

Figure 4 depicts a top level view of the encryption process. The cipher algorithm consists of four 16-bit block ciphers,  $E_{k_i}$  ( $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ ), four 16-bit internal state registers  $RSi$  ( $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ ), and a 16-bit linear feedback shift register (LFSR). The original 256-bit key is divided into four 64-bit subkeys  $k_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ , which are used in the four block




Figure 4: An overview of the Hummingbird encryption process.

ciphers.

A 16-bit plaintext block  $PT_i$  is added to the first internal state register  $RS1$  modulo  $2^{16}$ . The result of the addition is then encrypted by the first block cipher  $E_{k_1}$ . This procedure is repeated in a similar manner for another three times and the output of  $E_{k_4}$  is the corresponding ciphertext,  $CT_i$ . At the same time, the states of the four internal state registers will also be updated based on their current state values, the outputs of the first three block ciphers, and the value of the LFSR. The decryption process follows a similar pattern as in the encryption mode.



In practice, Hummingbird is initialized with four 16-bit random nonces,  $NONCE_i, i = 0, 1, 2, 3$ , to construct the four internal state registers  $RS_i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ , respectively, followed by applying the encryption algorithm to the message  $RS1 \boxplus RS3$ . The final 16-bit ciphertext of the initialization is used to initialize the LFSR where the 13<sup>th</sup> bit of the LFSR is always set to 1.

The 16-bit block cipher is a typical substitution-permutation (SP) network with 16-bit block size and 64-bit key. It consists of five rounds: four regular rounds and a final round that only includes the key mixing and the s-box substitution steps. Each round comprises of a key mixing step, a substitution layer, and a permutation layer. For the key mixing, a simple xor operation is used. Figure 5 depicts the structure of the 16-bit block cipher and the specification of the four s-boxes and linear transform mapping which are used in  $E_{k_i}$ .

The 64-bit subkey  $k_i$  is divided into four 16-bit round keys  $K_j^{(i)}, j = 1, 2, 3, 4$ , which are used in the four regular rounds of SP structure, respectively. Moreover, two keys  $K_5^{(i)}$  and  $K_6^{(i)}$  which are directly derived from the four round keys are applied before and after the last s-boxes.

Further details about the encryption, decryption and initialization processes can be found in [13].

### 4.3 The proposed attack

The main idea of using differential fault analysis against Hummingbird is to recover the whole secret keys based on determining round keys in four steps. In particular, we can

retrieve  $k_4$  and peel off the last round function of the encryption process ( $E_{k_4}$ ) to determine  $V34_t \boxplus RS4_t$ . Detailed explanation of how to recover the keys of the  $E_{k_i}$  step is provided in the next subsection. By guessing all the  $2^{16}$  values of  $RS4_t$  and applying the same method for determining the keys of the 16-bit block cipher ( $E_{k_3}$ ),  $k_3$  can be revealed. Similarly, the values of  $k_2$  and  $k_1$  can be determined by applying the same procedure and guessing  $RS3_t$  and  $RS2_t$ . Finally, by guessing  $RS2_t$ ,  $RS3_t$  and  $RS4_t$  we can determine  $2^{48}$  candidates for  $k_1, k_2, k_3$  and  $k_4$ . The correct key can then be uniquely determined using additional plaintext/ciphertext pairs.

#### 4.3.1 Key recovery of $E_{k_i}$

In this section, we describe a differential fault analysis on the  $E_{k_i}$  function which are used in Hummingbird algorithm. The injected faults are assumed to occur in one 4-bit word before the linear transform and after the  $4 \times 4$  s-boxes.

Consider one 4-bit word differences at the input of the linear layer  $L(x)$ . We have 60 ( $= 15 \times 4$ ) possible such differences corresponding to 4 different possible locations and 15 different possible values. Because of the linearity, the number of corresponding possible differences at its output is also 60 but, while the input difference affected one 4-bit word only, the output difference affects up to 12 bits because of the diffusion linear transformation layer (See Table 4.3.1.) Note that the key addition does not change the set of possible differences.

First we describe how we can recover the last round subkey  $K_6^{(i)}$ . We follow the same idea of the attack described in [69]. Algorithm 1 shows the details.

|                                       | Differential input = $(\Delta X_1 \triangle X_2 \triangle X_3 \triangle X_4)$ |                     |                     |                     |
|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                                       | $\Delta X_1 \neq 0$   | $\Delta X_2 \neq 0$ | $\Delta X_3 \neq 0$ | $\Delta X_4 \neq 0$ |
| The corresponding differential output | 1440  | 0144                | 4014                | 4401                |
|                                       | 2880  | 0288                | 8028                | 8802                |
|                                       | 3CC0  | 03CC                | C03C                | CC03                |
|                                       | 4011  | 1401                | 1140                | 0114                |
|                                       | 5451  | 1545                | 5154                | 4515                |
|                                       | 6891  | 1689                | 9168                | 8916                |
|                                       | 7CD1  | 17CD                | D17C                | CD17                |
|                                       | 8022  | 2802                | 2280                | 0228                |
|                                       | 9462  | 2946                | 6294                | 4629                |
|                                       | A8A2  | 2A8A                | A2A8                | 8A2A                |
|                                       | BCE2  | 2BCE                | E2BC                | CE2B                |
|                                       | C033  | 3C03                | 33C0                | 033C                |
|                                       | D473  | 3D47                | 73D4                | 473D                |
|                                       | E8B3  | 3E8B                | B3E8                | 8B3E                |
|                                       | FCF3  | 3FCF                | F3FC                | CF3F                |

Table 2: Possible differential outputs of the linear transformation - The  $\mathcal{D}$ 's list  
(Differential output =  $(\Delta Y_1 \triangle Y_2 \triangle Y_3 \triangle Y_4)$   
All values are in Hexadecimal)

**Algorithm 1:**

1. Compute the 60 possible differences at the output of linear transform  $(L(x))$ , i.e. the 60 values of  $L(x)$ , where  $x = x_1 || x_2 || x_3 || x_4$  and only one of the  $x_i$ 's has a Hamming weight not equal to zero. Store the obtained values in a list  $\mathcal{D}$ .
2. Consider a plaintext  $P$ , its corresponding ciphertext  $C$  and faulty ciphertext  $C'$ .
3. Guess the value of the round key  $K_6^{(i)}$ .
4. Compute the difference  $SBOX^{-1}(C \oplus K_6^{(i)}) \oplus SBOX^{-1}(C' \oplus K_6^{(i)})$ . Check whether it is in  $\mathcal{D}$ . If yes, add the round key to the list  $\mathcal{L}$  of possible candidates.

| Fault location                                 |         | The recovered data           | The recovered keys                               |
|--|---------|------------------------------|--|
| $E_{k_4}$                                      | round 4 | $K_2^{(4)} \oplus K_4^{(4)}$ | $K_2^{(4)}, K_4^{(4)}$<br>$K_1^{(4)}, K_3^{(4)}$ |
|  | round 3 | $K_1^{(4)} \oplus K_3^{(4)}$ |  |
|  | round 2 | $K_4^{(4)}$                  |  |
|  | round 1 | $K_3^{(4)}$                  |  |
| Guess all of $2^{16}$ possibilities of $RS4_t$ |         |                              | $\mapsto$ Get $V34_t$                            |
| $E_{k_3}$                                      | round 4 | $K_2^{(3)} \oplus K_4^{(3)}$ | $K_2^{(3)}, K_4^{(3)}$<br>$K_1^{(3)}, K_3^{(3)}$ |
|  | round 3 | $K_1^{(3)} \oplus K_3^{(3)}$ |  |
|  | round 2 | $K_4^{(3)}$                  |  |
|  | round 1 | $K_3^{(3)}$                  |  |
| Guess all of $2^{16}$ possibilities of $RS3_t$ |         |                              | $\mapsto$ Get $V23_t$                            |
| $E_{k_2}$                                      | round 4 | $K_2^{(2)} \oplus K_4^{(2)}$ | $K_2^{(2)}, K_4^{(2)}$<br>$K_1^{(2)}, K_3^{(2)}$ |
|  | round 3 | $K_1^{(2)} \oplus K_3^{(2)}$ |  |
|  | round 2 | $K_4^{(2)}$                  |  |
|  | round 1 | $K_2^{(4)}$                  |  |
| Guess all of $2^{16}$ possibilities of $RS2_t$ |         |                              | $\mapsto$ Get $V12_t$                            |
| $E_{k_1}$                                      | round 4 | $K_2^{(1)} \oplus K_4^{(1)}$ | $K_2^{(1)}, K_4^{(1)}$<br>$K_1^{(1)}, K_3^{(1)}$ |
|  | round 3 | $K_1^{(1)} \oplus K_3^{(1)}$ |  |
|  | round 2 | $K_4^{(1)}$                  |  |
|  | round 1 | $K_3^{(1)}$                  |  |

Table 3: Summary of the fault attack on Hummingbird

5. Consider a new plaintext  $P$  (with corresponding  $C$  and  $C'$ ) and go back to step 2.

This time, the round key guesses only go through the list  $\mathcal{L}$  of possible candidates. If the difference computed at step 4 is not in  $\mathcal{D}$ , remove the candidate from  $\mathcal{L}$ . Repeat until there remains only one candidate in  $\mathcal{L}$ .

The complexity of the Algorithm 1 is around  $2^{16}$  since we have to search all of the target key at the beginning of step 3 of the algorithm. After  $K_6^{(i)}$  is uniquely determined, the last round is peeled off, and the attack is repeated on the reduced cipher.

We can find the subkey  $K_5^{(i)}$  by repeating the same algorithm which is used to recover  $K_6^{(i)}$  but using the difference equation  $SBOX^{-1}(L^{-1}(C_{-1} \oplus K_5^{(i)})) \oplus SBOX^{-1}(L^{-1}(C'_{-1} \oplus K_5^{(i)}))$  where  $C_{-1} = SBOX^{-1}(C \oplus K_6^{(i)})$  and  $C'_{-1} = SBOX^{-1}(C' \oplus K_6^{(i)})$ .  $K_3^{(i)}$  and  $K_4^{(i)}$  are revealed in the same way. Finally, we determine the remaining subkeys of  $K_1^{(i)}$  and  $K_2^{(i)}$  by computing  $K_3^{(i)} \oplus K_5^{(i)}$  and  $K_4^{(i)} \oplus K_6^{(i)}$ , respectively.

The above attack was simulated for 10,000 times using different random values for the 16-bit input and 64-bit subkey of  $k_i$  for  $E_{k_i}$ . Based on our simulations, our attack requires an average of 12.51 fault injections to recover the whole subkeys,  $k_i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4$ . The recorded minimum and the largest number of required faults were 8 and 22, respectively.

Table 4.3.1 summarizes the whole steps of the attack to recover the 256-bit secret key.

After the keys are recovered, we can then find the other internal registers by applying the initialization process since the values of  $NONCE_i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3)$  are public.

### 4.3.2 The complexity of our attack

To recover all of the 256-bit secret key we have to apply the above fault attack for four times and guess all candidate values of the three internal registers:  $RS2_t$ ,  $RS3_t$  and  $RS4_t$ . From our experimental results, we need around 12.5 faulty values to uniquely determine each subround key. Thus, our attack requires 50 faulty ciphertext,  $2^{48}$  guessing of 16-bit values and calling Algorithm 1 (with complexity  $2^{16}$ ) in each step to reveal the subkeys. Since we have to use four times of the Algorithm 1 in each step of  $E_{k_i}$ , the total complexity of our attack is about  $4 \times 2^{16} \times 2^{48} = 2^{66}$ .

## 4.4 Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we presented a fault attack against a newly introduced ultra lightweight encryption algorithm, Hummingbird. Each 64-bit round key can be found, on average, using 12.51 faulty encryptions. If we assume that the 256-bit secret key and 80-bit internal state have random distribution, then the whole cipher can be broken after around 50 faults. To fully recover the key, we have to guess  $2^{48}$  values of three 16-bit internal state registers which brings the whole complexity of our attack to  $2^{66}$ .




Figure 5: The structure of  $E_{k_i}$  - the 16-bit block cipher of Hummingbird in encryption mode.

# **Chapter 5**

## **Scan Based Side Channel Attack on ZUC**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Recently, a new set of cryptographic algorithms was proposed by the Data Assurance and Communication Security (DACAS) research center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences [14, 15] for inclusion in the 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) mobile standard. The core of the new LTE cryptographic algorithms consist of an encryption algorithm, called 128-EEA3, and an integrity algorithm, called 128-EIA3.

The ZUC algorithm [86, 87] is the core of the proposed confidentiality and integrity algorithms. ZUC is a word-oriented stream cipher that generates a key stream of 32-bit words based on two stages of execution. It uses a 128-bit key and a 128-bit initial vector (iv) as input. The two execution stages of ZUC are the key initialization stage and



the working stage. In the first stage, a key initialization is performed, i.e., the cipher is clocked without producing any output. In the second stage, a 32-bit word of output is produced with every round. Preliminary evaluation of the ZUC algorithm, conducted by the algorithm standardization group ETSI SAGE, concluded that it is a strong and suitable candidate for the LTE. Some other evaluations were also presented in the first international workshop on ZUC algorithm [88]. Generally, all of these security evaluations considered only the potential theoretical weaknesses of the algorithm. On the other hand, hardware implementations [89] of cryptographic algorithm are used in many applications in order to achieve the growing requirements for high throughput. Thus, hardware implementation related attacks have to be considered.

In this chapter, we present a scan-based attack on ZUC. A scan path connects registers in a circuit serially so that a tester can observe the register values inside the circuit. The scan path is widely used in recent circuit implementations due to its ease of implementation and high test coverage [90]. Scan-based attacks exploit the scan chains that are inserted into the devices for the purpose of testing. Scan based attacks have been demonstrated on block ciphers such as DES [73] and AES [91], stream ciphers [74, 75] and public keys such as elliptic curve cryptosystems [90]. Our scan based attack on ZUC allows us to uniquely determine the corresponding locations of the inner state variables (the LFSR registers and the memory cells) in the output scan chain and consequently recover the secret initial state.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of scan based analysis attacks. In section 5.3, relevant details of ZUC are reviewed. Details of the attack are described in section 5.4. Finally, the conclusion is given

in section 5.5.

## 5.2 General description of the attack

Scan chain based attacks can be considered as a class of side channel attacks that targets the design for testability feature of modern hardware circuitry. This design for testability is a design technique in which scan chains are kept with the objective to test designs by providing a simple way to set and observe every flip flop in the hardware circuit. A special signal, scan enable, is added to the design. When this scan enable signal is set, every flip flop of the tested circuit is connected as a chain of registers. The data to this chain is provided through one input pin and the scan output is provided through another output pin. An input pattern can be scanned into the registers on each clock event. Then after a normal run of the circuit, the scan chain content can be scanned out for testing.

In 2004, Yang *et al.* [73] introduced the notion of scan based attacks against dedicated hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms and described the details of these attacks against DES. This class of attacks was extended to AES in [91] and [92]. Besides, a scan-based attack against ECC was proposed in [90]. Scan based attacks against stream ciphers were introduced by Agrawal *et al* [74], where a detailed attack against Trivium was described. Liu *et al* in [75] presented scan based attacks against other LFSR-based stream ciphers where this technique was applied on the six such stream ciphers including DECIM, Pomaranch, A5/1, A5/2, w7 and LILI II.

Scan based attacks have two phases [74]: ascertaining the internal structure of the scan

chain and deciphering the cryptosystem by revealing the secret internal data. Throughout our analysis, we assume that:

- The attacker knows the details of the cipher algorithm.
- The attacker has access to high level timing diagram of the hardware implementation.
- The secret key is stored in a secure memory and is not part of the scan chain.
- The attacker does not know the structure of the scan chain.
- The device under attack can be run for any prespecified number of clock cycles chosen by the attacker.
- The attacker can scan out the states of internal registers of the device after any prespecified number of clock cycles.
- The attacker can scan in chosen vectors and apply chosen inputs to the device under attack.

For our analysis, we assume a straightforward hardware implementation of ZUC that does not imply any pipelining optimization. We consider an implementation in which both stages of ZUC, the initialization stage and the working stage, are performed in hardware. Furthermore, we assume that the key loading procedure (see section 5.3) is performed off line and then its result is loaded into the LFSR. In this scenario, the hardware associated with the internal state of ZUC would consists of 496 bits for the LFSR and 64 bits for  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ . In other words, the scan chain for ZUC will have a total of 560 bits.

## 5.3 The ZUC specifications

ZUC is a word-oriented stream cipher which takes a 128-bit initial key and a 128-bit initial vector ( $iv$ ) as input and generates a 32-bit word as an output in every clock cycle. This key stream can be used to encrypt the plaintext. ZUC utilizes three main components to generate the keystream output: a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), bit-reorganization (BR) and non-linear function ( $F$ ).

The following notation, mostly from [14, 15], will be used throughout the rest of this chapter:

- $\boxplus$  : The addition modulo  $2^{32}$ .
- $\oplus$  : The bit-wise XOR.
- $\vee$  : The bit-wise OR.
- $\wedge$  : The bit-wise AND.
- $\overline{X}$  : The bit-wise complement of an  $n$ -bit word  $X$ .
- $\parallel$  : Concatenation.
- $\text{mod}$  : The modulo operation of integers.
- $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n) \longrightarrow (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n)$  : The assignment of the values of  $a_i$  to  $b_i$  in parallel.
- $a_H$  : The leftmost 16 bits of integer  $a$ .

- $a_L$  : The rightmost 16 bits of integer  $a$ .
- $a \lll_n k$  : The  $k$ -bit cyclic shift of the  $n$ -bit register  $a$  to the left.
- $a \gg 1$  : The 1-bit right shift of integer  $a$ .
- $X_i^j$ : The  $j$ -th bit of an  $n$ -bit word  $X_i$ .
- $X_i^j(t)$ : The  $j$ -th bit of an  $n$ -bit word  $X_i$  after  $t$  clock cycles.
- $X_i^j$ : The  $j$ -th bit of an  $n$ -bit word  $X_i$  has been set to 1 but its corresponding location in the scan chain output has not been determined uniquely.
- $\check{X}_i^j$ : The location, in the scan chain output, of the  $j$ -th bit of an  $n$ -bit word  $X_i$  has been determined uniquely.

Figure 6 shows the three dependent layers of ZUC. The secret inner state of ZUC consists of the LFSR and the F function layers which have sixteen 31-bit words ( $s_0, \dots, s_{15}$ ) and 2 32-bit words ( $R_1, R_2$ ), respectively. The LFSR has two modes of operations: the initialization mode and the working mode.

According to the new version of the ZUC specifications [15], the first mode works as follows:

LFSR With Initialization Mode ( $u$ ) {

1.  $v = 2^{15}s_{15} + 2^{17}s_{13} + 2^{21}s_{10} + 2^{20}s_4 + (1 + 2^8)s_0 \bmod (2^{31} - 1);$
2.  $s_{16} = (v + u) \bmod (2^{31} - 1);$
3. If  $s_{16} = 0$ , then set  $s_{16} = 2^{31} - 1;$




Figure 6: Overview of the ZUC stream cipher

$$4. (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_{15}, s_{16}) \longrightarrow (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{14}, s_{15}).\}$$

In the working mode, the LFSR does not receive any input, and it updates its current state as follows:

LFSR With Work Mode() {

$$1. s_{16} = 2^{15}s_{15} + 2^{17}s_{13} + 2^{21}s_{10} + 2^{20}s_4 + (1 + 2^8)s_0 \bmod (2^{31} - 1);$$

$$2. \text{ If } s_{16} = 0, \text{ then set } s_{16} = 2^{31} - 1;$$

$$3. (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_{15}, s_{16}) \longrightarrow (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{14}, s_{15}).\}$$

The bit-reorganization layer extracts 128 bits from 8 registers of the LFSR and forms 4 32-bit words as follows:

Bit reorganization() {

$$1. X_0 = s_{15H} || s_{14L};$$

$$2. X_1 = s_{11L} || s_{9H};$$

$$3. X_2 = s_{7L} || s_{5H};$$

$$4. X_3 = s_{2L} || s_{0H}.\}$$

The nonlinear function  $F$  consists of two 32-bit words  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  as memory cells.  $F$  takes  $X_0, X_1$  and  $X_2$  as it's inputs, which are the outputs of the bit-reorganization layer, then outputs a 32-bit word  $W$  as follows:

$F(X_0, X_1, X_2)$  {

$$1. W = (X_0 \oplus R_1) \boxplus R_2;$$

$$2. W_1 = R_1 \boxplus X_1;$$

$$3. W_2 = R_2 \oplus X_2;$$

$$4. R_1 = S(L_1(W_{1L} || W_{2H}));$$

$$5. R_2 = S(L_2(W_{2L} || W_{1H})).\}$$

where  $S$  is a  $32 \times 32$  s-box,  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  are linear transformation. The s-box is composed by 4 juxtaposed  $8 \times 8$  s-boxes, i.e.,  $S = (S_0, S_1, S_0, S_1)$ . The lookup table definition of these s-boxes can be found in [15].  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  are linear mapping from 32-bit words to 32-bit words, and are defined as follows:

$$L_1(X) = X \oplus (X \lll_{32} 2) \oplus (X \lll_{32} 10) \oplus (X \lll_{32} 18) \oplus (X \lll_{32} 24)$$

$$L_2(X) = X \oplus (X \lll_{32} 8) \oplus (X \lll_{32} 14) \oplus (X \lll_{32} 22) \oplus (X \lll_{32} 30)$$

The execution of ZUC has two stages: key initialization stage and working stage. The algorithm first calls the key loading procedure to load the key and the  $iv$  into the LFSR as the initial state and set  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  to all 0's.

The key loading procedure works as follows:

**Key loading {**

1. Let  $D$  be a 240 bit constant value by

$$D = d_0 || d_1 || \dots || d_{15}$$

2. For  $i = 0 \dots 15$ , let  $s_i = k_i || d_i || iv_i$ .

where  $d_i$  are 16 15-bit constant values,  $k_i$  and  $iv_i, i = 0 \dots 15$  are all bytes of the 128-bit initial key  $k$  and the 128-bit initial vector  $iv$  respectively. Then the cipher runs the following operation 32 times to finish the key initialization stage.

**The initialization stage {**

1. Bit reorganization();



2.  $w = F(X_0, X_1, X_2);$
3. LFSR With Initialization Mode( $w \gg 1$ ).}

After the initialization stage and the first iteration of the working stage, in which the output  $W$  of  $F$  is discarded, the algorithm goes into the stage of generation key stream. For each iteration, the following operations are done once and a 32-bit word  $Z$  is produced as an output:

**The working stage {**

1. Bit reorganization();
2.  $Z = F(X_0, X_1, X_2) \oplus X_3;$
3. LFSR With Work Mode(). }

## 5.4 The proposed attack

### 5.4.1 Overview

Our proposed attack is applicable to scenarios where the attacker has access to the encryption hardware device after the key loading process and the initialization stage have been executed. The proposed scan based attack allows the attacker to recover the internal state of the cipher, but not the key, since we assume that the key bits are stored in a secure memory and cannot be scanned out. According to our scan based analysis model, the attacker is also assumed to be able to re-initialize the encryption device an arbitrary number of times and obtain the values of the states of internal registers of the device after each clock cycle.

The attack can be divided into two phases. The first phase uses the key loading procedure to determine correspondence between the individual bits in the scan chain output and the  $s_i$  bits that are loaded with the 128-bit initial key  $k$  and the 128-bit initial vector  $iv$  in step 2 of the key initialization stage.

In the second phase (explained in sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4), the attacker determines the remaining structure of the scan chain, i.e., the attacker determines the exact location of the remaining internal state registers including the remaining bits of the LFSR and the memory cells  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ .

### 5.4.2 Key loading stage

The scan out bits corresponding to the 256 bits of the LFSR register that are loaded with the 128-bit initial key  $k$  and the 128-bit initial vector  $iv$  in step 2 of the key initialization stage can be determined by the key loading procedure as follows:

For  $l = 0 \dots 127$ :

- 1 Set  $iv=0$  and  $k = 2^l$ .
- 2 Load the  $k$  and the  $iv$ .
- 3 Determine the location corresponding to the  $l^{th}$  bit in  $k$  (which is set to 1) in the *scanned – out*.
- 4 Use *scanned – in* with the information of step 2 to determine the correspondence in the *scanned – in* position.

The above procedure recovers the positions, in the scan out chain, corresponding to the most significant bytes of the LFSR. Recovering the position of the least significant bytes can be achieved by applying the same procedure with  $k=0$  and  $iv = 2^l$ . Thus, after this step, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \check{S}_i^{31}, \check{S}_i^{30}, \check{S}_i^{29}, \check{S}_i^{28}, \check{S}_i^{27}, \check{S}_i^{26}, \check{S}_i^{25}, \check{S}_i^{24}, \\ & \check{S}_i^8, \check{S}_i^7, \check{S}_i^6, \check{S}_i^5, \check{S}_i^4, \check{S}_i^3, \check{S}_i^2, \check{S}_i^1 \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

for  $i=0 \dots 15$ .

### 5.4.3 Determining the locations of the remaining LFSR bits

In what follows, we show how to determine the remaining  $16 \times 15 = 240$  bit position of the LFSR (which are loaded by the  $d_i$  values in the key loading procedure). We also show how to determine four bits of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  ( $R_1^{15}, R_1^{18}, R_1^{22}, R_2^{32}$ ).

First, we initialize the LFSR register,  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  with all 0's and then run the system for 1 clock cycle to determine some specific positions. Then, we reset the circuit and scan in a specific input pattern with a Hamming weight equals "1". Finally we run the system for a prespecified number of clock cycles to load the above pattern and then perform a scan out operation. As shown below, examining the output pattern in the scan chain output allows us to determine the required bit positions.

## 1. Determining the bit locations of $S_{15}$ :

(a) Set  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

- $X_0 = X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(1)=0x3E553E55$  and  $R_2(1)=0x3E553E55$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{31} - 1$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 0x7FFFFFFF)$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x3E553E55, 0x3E553E55)$ .

Thus all the activated bits, i.e., the bits that are set to "1" in the above process, belong to  $S_{15}$ ,  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ .

(b) For  $i = 0 \dots 7$ : set  $S_0(0) = 2^i$ ,  $S_1(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

- $X_0 = X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(1)=0x3E553E55$  and  $R_2(1)=0x3E553E55$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^i + 2^{i+8}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i + 2^{i+8})$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x3E553E55, 0x3E553E55)$ .

The values of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  remain the same as in step 1a. On the other hand, two bits of  $S_{15}$  will change which allows us to determine the position of the  $(i + 9)^{th}$ ,  $i = 0 \dots 7$ , bit in  $S_{15}$  which corresponds to  $2^{i+8}$  in the equations

above. Consequently, at the end of this step we have

$$\check{S}_{15}^9, \check{S}_{15}^{10}, \check{S}_{15}^{11}, \check{S}_{15}^{12}, \check{S}_{15}^{13}, \check{S}_{15}^{14}, \check{S}_{15}^{15}, \check{S}_{15}^{16}$$

(c) For  $i = 0 \dots 5$ : set  $S_{13}(0) = 2^i$ ,  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{12}(0) = S_{14}(0) = S_{15}(0) = 0$

and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

- $X_0 = X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(1) = 0x3E553E55$  and  $R_2(1) = 0x3E553E55$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{i+17}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 2^i, 0, 0, 2^{i+17})$ .
- $(R_1, R_2) = (0x3E553E55, 0x3E553E55)$ .

Again, the positions of activated bits in  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  do not change from step 1a.

However the  $(i+18)^{th}$ ,  $i = 0 \dots 5$ , bit of  $S_{15}$ , which corresponds to  $2^{i+17}$  in the equations above, will change which allows us to determine the exact positions of these bits. Finally, the position of the remaining bit  $S_{15}^{17}$ , can be found from the fact that all positions of  $S_{15}$  are already determined during step 1a. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$\check{S}_{15}^{17}, \check{S}_{15}^{18}, \check{S}_{15}^{19}, \check{S}_{15}^{20}, \check{S}_{15}^{21}, \check{S}_{15}^{22}, \check{S}_{15}^{23}$$

## 2. Determining the bit locations of $S_{14}$ :

(a) Set  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0) = 0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 2 clock cycles

we have:

- $X_0 = X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(2)=0x38A538A5$  and  $R_2(2)=0x34813481$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{31} - 1$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF)$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x38A538A5, 0x34813481)$ .

Thus all the activated bits, i.e., the bits that are set to "1" in the above process, belong to  $S_{14}, S_{15}, R_1$  and  $R_2$ .

(b) For  $i = 0 \dots 7$ : set  $S_0(0) = 2^i$ ,  $S_1(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 2 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 = X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(2)=0x38A538A5$  and  $R_2(2)=0x34813481$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{15+i} + 2^{23+i}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i + 2^{i+8}, 2^{15+i} + 2^{23+i})$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x38A538A5, 0x34813481)$ .

The values of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  remain the same as in step 2a. On the other hand, two bits of  $S_{14}$  will change which allows us to determine the position of the  $(i + 9)^{th}, i = 0 \dots 7$ , bit in  $S_{14}$  which corresponds to  $2^{i+8}$  in the equations above. Consequently, at the end of this step we have

$$\overset{\checkmark}{S_{14}^9} \overset{\checkmark}{S_{14}^{10}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{14}^{11}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{14}^{12}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{14}^{13}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{14}^{14}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{14}^{15}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{14}^{16}}$$

(c) For  $i = 1 \dots 7$ : set  $S_{15}(0) = 2^i, S_0(0) = \dots = S_{14}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) =$

0. Then after 2 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 \neq 0, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(2)=0x38A538A5$  and  $R_2(2)=0x34813481$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{i+17}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{14}) = (0, 0, \dots, 2^i, 2^{i+15})$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x38A538A5, 0x34813481)$ .

Again, the positions of activated bits in  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  do not change from step 2a.

However the  $(i + 16)^{th}, i = 1 \dots 7$ , bit of  $S_{14}$ , which corresponds to  $2^{i+15}$  in the equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions of these bits. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$\overset{\checkmark}{S}_{14}^{17}, \overset{\checkmark}{S}_{14}^{18}, \overset{\checkmark}{S}_{14}^{19}, \overset{\checkmark}{S}_{14}^{20}, \overset{\checkmark}{S}_{14}^{21}, \overset{\checkmark}{S}_{14}^{22}, \overset{\checkmark}{S}_{14}^{23}$$

### 3. Determining the bit locations of $S_{13}$ :

(a) Set  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 3 clock cycles

we have:

- $X_0 = 0xFFFFFFFF, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(3)=0x5334B0EC$  and  $R_2(3)=0xFE03AA92$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{31} - 1$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF,$

0x7FFFFFFF).

- $(R_1, R_2) = (0x5334B0EC, 0xFE03AA92)$ .

Thus all the activated bits, i.e. the bits that are set to "1" in the above process, belong to  $S_{13}, S_{14}, S_{15}, R_1$  and  $R_2$ .

- (b) For  $i = 0 \dots 7$ : set  $S_0(0) = 2^i, S_1(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0) = 0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 3 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 \neq 0, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(3) = 0x5334B0EC$  and  $R_2(3) = 0xFE03AA92$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{15+i} + 2^{23+i}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{13}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i + 2^{i+8})$ .
- $(R_1, R_2) = (0x5334B0EC, 0xFE03AA92)$ .

The values of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  remain the same as in step 3a. On the other hand, two bits of  $S_{13}$  are changed during the clocks which allows us to determine the position of the  $(i + 9)^{th}, i = 0 \dots 7$ , bit in  $S_{13}$  which corresponds to  $2^{i+8}$  in the equations above. Consequently, at the end of this step we have

$$\overset{\checkmark}{S_{13}^9} \overset{\checkmark}{S_{13}^{10}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{13}^{11}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{13}^{12}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{13}^{13}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{13}^{14}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{13}^{15}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{13}^{16}}$$

- (c) For  $i = 1 \dots 7$ : set  $S_{15}(0) = 2^i, S_0(0) = \dots = S_{14}(0) = 0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 3 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 \neq 0, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .



- $R_1(3)=0x5334B0EC$  and  $R_2(3)=0xFE03AA92$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{i+17}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{13}) = (0, 0, \dots, 2^i, 2^{i+15})$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x5334B0EC, 0xFE03AA92)$ .

Again, the positions of activated bits in  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  do not change from step 3a.

However the  $(i + 16)^{th}$ ,  $i = 1 \dots 7$ , bit of  $S_{13}$ , which corresponds to  $2^{i+15}$  in the equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions of these bits. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$\checkmark S_{13}^{17}, \checkmark S_{13}^{18}, \checkmark S_{13}^{19}, \checkmark S_{13}^{20}, \checkmark S_{13}^{21}, \checkmark S_{13}^{22}, \checkmark S_{13}^{23}$$

#### 4. Determining the bit locations of $S_{12}$ :

(a) Set  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 4 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 = 0xFFFFFFFF, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(4)=0x39A8912E$  and  $R_2(4)=0x14AE6F5C$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{31} - 1$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF)$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x39A8912E, 0x14AE6F5C)$ .

Thus all the activated bits, i.e. the bits that are set to "1" in the above process,

belong to  $S_{12}, S_{13}, S_{14}, S_{15}, R_1$  and  $R_2$ .

(b) For  $i = 0 \dots 7$ : set  $S_0(0) = 2^i, S_1(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) =$

0. Then after 4 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 \neq 0, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(4)=0x39A8912E$  and  $R_2(4)=0x14AE6F5C$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{15+i} + 2^{23+i}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{12}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i + 2^{i+8})$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x39A8912E, 0x14AE6F5C)$ .

The values of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  remain the same as in step 4a. On the other hand, two bits of  $S_{12}$  are changed during the clocks which allows us to determine the position of the  $(i + 9)^{th}, i = 0 \dots 7$ , bit in  $S_{12}$  which corresponds to  $2^{i+8}$  in the equations above. Consequently, at the end of this step we have

$$\overset{\checkmark}{S_{12}^9} \overset{\checkmark}{S_{12}^{10}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{12}^{11}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{12}^{12}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{12}^{13}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{12}^{14}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{12}^{15}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{12}^{16}}$$

(c) For  $i = 1 \dots 7$ : set  $S_{15}(0) = 2^i, S_0(0) = \dots = S_{14}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) =$

0. Then after 4 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 \neq 0, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(4)=0x39A8912E$  and  $R_2(4)=0x14AE6F5C$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{i+17}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{12}) = (0, 0, \dots, 2^i, 2^{i+15})$ .

- $(R_1, R_2) = (0x39A8912E, 0x14AE6F5C)$ .

Again, the positions of activated bits in  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  do not change from step 4a.

However the  $(i + 16)^{th}$ ,  $i = 1 \dots 7$ , bit of  $S_{12}$ , which corresponds to  $2^{i+15}$  in the equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions of these bits. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$\check{S}_{12}^{17}, \check{S}_{12}^{18}, \check{S}_{12}^{19}, \check{S}_{12}^{20}, \check{S}_{12}^{21}, \check{S}_{12}^{22}, \check{S}_{12}^{23}$$

### 5. Determining the bit locations of $S_{11}$ and $R_1^{22}$ :

- (a) Set  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0) = 0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 5 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 = 0xFFFFFFFF, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(5) = 0xBF289712$  and  $R_2(5) = 0x21513161$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{31} - 1$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF)$ .
- $(R_1, R_2) = (0xBF289712, 0x21513161)$ .

Thus all the activated bits, i.e., the bits that are set to "1" in the above process, belong to  $S_{11}, S_{12}, S_{13}, S_{14}, S_{15}, R_1$  and  $R_2$ . At the end of this step, the  $22^{th}$  bit of  $R_1$  can be determined by matching and comparing with the previous values of  $R_1$  ( $\check{R}_1^{22}$ ).

(b) For  $i = 0 \dots 7$ : set  $S_0(0) = 2^i$ ,  $S_1(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) =$

0. Then after 5 clock cycles we have:

- $X_0 \neq 0, X_1 = X_2 = X_3 = 0$ .
- $R_1(5)=0\text{xBF289712}$  and  $R_2(5)=0\text{x21513161}$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{15+i} + 2^{23+i}$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{11}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i + 2^{i+8})$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0\text{xBF289712}, 0\text{x21513161})$ .

The values of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  remain the same as in step 5a. On the other hand, two bits of  $S_{11}$  are changed during the clocks which allows us to determine the position of the  $(i + 9)^{th}$ ,  $i = 0 \dots 7$ , bit in  $S_{11}$  which corresponds to  $2^{i+8}$  in the equations above. Consequently, at the end of this step we have

$$\overset{\checkmark}{S_{11}^9} \overset{\checkmark}{S_{11}^{10}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{11}^{11}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{11}^{12}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{11}^{13}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{11}^{14}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{11}^{15}}, \overset{\checkmark}{S_{11}^{16}}$$

(c) For  $i = 16 \dots 22$ : set  $S_{12}(0) = 2^i$ ,  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{11}(0) = S_{13}(0) = S_{14}(0) = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

- $X_1 = X_2 = 0$ .
- $R_1(1) = R_2(1)=0\text{x3E553E55}$ .
- $S_{16} = 2^{31} - 1$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{15}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i, 0, 0, 0, 2^{31} - 1)$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0\text{x3E553E55}, 0\text{x3E553E55})$ .

Again, the positions of activated bits in  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  do not change from step 1a. However, the  $(i + 1)^{th}$ ,  $i = 16 \dots 22$ , bit of  $S_{11}$ , which corresponds to  $2^i$  in the equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions of these bits. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$\check{S}_{11}^{17}, \check{S}_{11}^{18}, \check{S}_{11}^{19}, \check{S}_{11}^{20}, \check{S}_{11}^{21}, \check{S}_{11}^{22}, \check{S}_{11}^{23}$$

## 6. Determining the bit locations of $S_{10}$ and $R_2^{32}$ :

(a) For  $i = 8 \dots 22$ : set  $S_{11}(0) = 2^i$ ,  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{10}(0) = S_{12}(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0) = 0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

- $X_1 = 2^{i+16}$ , and  $X_2 = 0$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_{10}) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i)$ .
- $R_1(1) = 0x3E553E55$  and  $R_2(1) \neq 0$  (For the first 8 values of  $i$ ,  $i = 8 \dots 15$ )
  - $i = 8, R_2(1) = 0x762072DD \implies \check{S}_{10}^9$
  - $i = 9, R_2(1) = 0xB1AE5BAD \implies \overset{?}{S}_{10}^{10}$  and  $\overset{?}{R}_2^{32}$
  - $i = 10, R_2(1) = 0x723BE0C2 \implies \check{S}_{10}^{11}$
  - $i = 11, R_2(1) = 0x5B9F5463 \implies \check{S}_{10}^{12}$
  - $i = 12, R_2(1) = 0xCA8CAF3B \implies \overset{?}{S}_{10}^{13}$  and  $\overset{?}{R}_2^{32}$ , the position of  $R_2^{32}$  is activated again. So, all positions of  $\check{S}_{10}^{10}, \check{R}_2^{32}$  and  $\check{S}_{10}^{13}$  can be determined:  $\check{S}_{10}^{10}, \check{S}_{10}^{13}$  and  $\check{R}_2^{32}$ .
  - $i = 13, R_2(1) = 0x0444DD9F \implies \check{S}_{10}^{14}$

$$- i = 14, R_2(1)=0x7BDDE38C \implies \check{S}_{10}^{15}$$

$$- i = 15, R_2(1)=0x4DADBC44 \implies \check{S}_{10}^{16}$$

- $R_1(1) = R_2(1) = 0x3E553E55$  (For the last 7 values of  $i, i = 16 \dots 22$ ).

Again, the positions of activated bits in  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  do not change from step

1a. However the  $(i+1)^{th}, i = 16 \dots 22$ , bit of  $S_{10}$ , which corresponds to  $2^i$

in the equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact

positions of these bits. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$\check{S}_{10}^{17}, \check{S}_{10}^{18}, \check{S}_{10}^{19}, \check{S}_{10}^{20}, \check{S}_{10}^{21}, \check{S}_{10}^{22}, \check{S}_{10}^{23}$$

Finally, we can find all unknown positions of  $S_{10}$  and the most significant bit place of  $R_2$  at the end of this step.

## 7. Determining the bit locations of $S_9$ :

(a) For  $i = 8 \dots 22$ : set  $S_{10}(0) = 2^i, S_0(0) = \dots = S_9(0) = S_{11}(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

- $X_1 = X_2 = 0$ .
- $R_1(1) = R_2(1)=0x3E553E55$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_9) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i)$ .
- $(R_1, R_2)=(0x3E553E55, 0x3E553E55)$ .

Again, the positions of activated bits in  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  do not change from step 1a.

However the  $(i+1)^{th}, i = 8 \dots 22$ , bit of  $S_9$ , which corresponds to  $2^i$  in the

equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions of these bits. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$\check{S}_9^9 \dots, \check{S}_9^{23}$$

### 8. Determining the bit locations of $S_8$ , $R_1^{15}$ and $R_1^{18}$ :

(a) For  $i = 8 \dots 22$ : set  $S_9(0) = 2^i$ ,  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_8(0) = S_{10}(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0) = 0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_8) = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 2^i)$ .
- $R_1(1) = R_2(1) = 0x3E553E55$  (For  $i = 8 \dots 14$ ).

The values of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  remain the same as in step 1a. On the other hand, two bits of  $S_8$  are changed during the clocks which allows us to determine the position of the  $(i + 1)^{th}$ ,  $i = 8 \dots 14$ , bit in  $S_8$  which corresponds to  $2^i$  in the equations above. Consequently, at the end of this step we have

$$\check{S}_8^9 \check{S}_8^{10}, \check{S}_8^{11}, \check{S}_8^{12}, \check{S}_8^{13}, \check{S}_8^{14}, \check{S}_8^{15}$$

- $R_2(1) = 0x3E553E55$  and  $R_1(1) \neq 0$  (For  $i = 15, 16, 17$ )
  - $X_1 = 2^{i-15}$ , and  $X_2 = 0$ .
  - $i = 15$ ,  $R_1(1) = 0xCAC8723B \implies \overset{?}{S}_8^{16}$  and  $\overset{?}{R}_1^{15}$ .
  - $i = 16$ ,  $R_1(1) = 0x04DA5B9F \implies \overset{?}{S}_8^{17}$ ,  $\overset{?}{R}_1^{15}$  and  $\overset{?}{R}_1^{18}$ . So, the other three places are activated. Then, the position of  $R_1^{15}$  can be determined

( $\check{R}_1^{15}$ ). Besides, the position of  $S_8^{16}$  can be found easily after finding the position of  $R_1^{15}$  as well ( $\check{S}_8^{16}$ ). However, positions of  $S_8^{17}$  and  $R_1^{18}$  are still unknown.

–  $i = 17, R_1(1)=0x7BA6CA8C \implies \overset{?}{S}_8^{18}$  and  $\overset{?}{R}_1^{18}$ , two positions are activated where  $R_1^{18}$  was just activated in the previous step. Then,  $R_1^{18}$  can be determined ( $\check{R}_1^{18}$ ). Finally,  $S_8^{18}$  can be found easily after finding the position of  $R_1^{18}$  ( $\check{S}_8^{18}$ ).

- For the last 5 values of  $i = 18 \dots 22$ , all positions of  $R_1(1)$  and  $R_2(1)$  are already distinguishable based on their previous values. the  $(i + 1)^{th}, i = 18 \dots 22$ , bit of  $S_8$ , which corresponds to  $2^i$ , is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions of these bits. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$\check{S}_8^{19}, \check{S}_8^{20}, \check{S}_8^{21}, \check{S}_8^{22}, \check{S}_8^{23}, \check{R}_1^{15}, \check{R}_1^{18}$$

Thus, at the end of this step we are able to find all unknown positions of  $S_8$  and two bit locations of  $R_1$ .

## 9. Determining the bit locations of $S_0 \dots S_7$ :

(a) For  $j = 8 \dots 1$

For  $i = 8 \dots 22$ , set:

$$S_j(0) = 2^i, S_0(0) = \dots = S_{j-1}(0) = S_{j+1}(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0 \text{ and } R_1(0) =$$

$R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:



- $X_1 = 0$ .
- $(S_0, S_1, \dots, S_j) = (0, 0, \dots, 2^i)$ .
- $R_1(1) \neq 0$  and  $R_2(1) \neq 0$ . All of activated positions of  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  are already distinguishable from the other registers based on their previous values.

Again, the positions of activated bits in  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  do not change from previous steps. However the  $(i + 1)^{th}, i = 8 \dots 22$ , bit of  $S_j, j = 8 \dots 1$ , which corresponds to  $2^i$  in the equations above, is changed which allows us to determine the exact positions of these bits. Thus at the end of this step we have

$$S_{j-1}^9 \dots, S_{j-1}^{23}$$

#### 5.4.4 Determining the location of the remaining bits in $R_1$ and $R_2$

In this section, we show how to determine the position of the remaining bits of the memory cells. To achieve this, first we reset all registers to 0. Then, by examining the scan out chain after clocking the circuit with a prespecified number of clock cycles, as shown below, we are able to determine the position of these bits.

##### 1. Determining the bit locations of $R_1^6, R_1^{23}, R_1^{26}, R_1^{28}, R_1^{31}$ and $R_2^7$ :

Set  $S_0(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0) = 0$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . During 5 clock cycles we have:

(a)  $R_1(1) = 0x3E553E55, R_2(1) = 0x3E553E55$ .

(b)  $R_1(2) = 0x38A538A5$ ,  $R_2(2) = 0x34813481$ .

(c)  $R_1(3) = 0x5334B0EC$ ,  $R_2(3) = 0x FE03AA92$ .

(d)  $R_1(4) = 0x39A8912E$ ,  $R_2(4) = 0x14AE6F5C$ .

(e)  $R_1(5) = 0xBF289712$ ,  $R_2(5) = 0x21513161$ .

The location of the "1" bit in

$$R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(5)[1e]})$$

corresponds to the position of  $R_1^6$  where  $R_1(2)[1b]$  is the value of  $R_1$  in the  $2^{nd}$  clock of the process 1b. In other words, the formula illustrates that the position of  $R_1^6$  can be determined uniquely provided that this specific location must be "1" in steps 1b, 1c and 1d and be "0" in steps 1a and 1e respectively. Similarly, the other bits can be located as presented in Table 4.

|   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e]})$       | $\implies R_1^{23}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge (\overline{R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(4)[1d]})$   | $\implies R_1^{26}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge (\overline{R_1(3)[1c]})$ | $\implies R_1^{28}$ |
| $R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(4)[1d]})$     | $\implies R_1^{31}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge (\overline{R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c]})$   | $\implies R_2^7$    |

Table 4: Formulas used in step 1

**2. Determining the bit locations of  $R_1^{24}, R_2^1, R_2^2, R_2^{12}, R_2^{13}, R_2^{17}, R_2^{24}, R_2^{25}, R_2^{26}, R_2^{29}$  and**

$R_2^{30}$ :

Set  $S_{11}(0) = 2^{15}, S_0(0) = \dots = S_{10}(0) = S_{12}(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and

$R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after one clock cycle we have:

$$(a) \ R_1(1)=0x3E553E55, R_2(1)=0x4DADBC44.$$

The location of the "1" bit in

$$R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[2a]})$$

corresponds to the position of  $R_1^{24}$  and it can be determined uniquely.

Similarly, the location of the other bits can be determined as shown in Table 5.

**3. Determining the bit locations of  $R_1^1, R_1^3, R_1^4, R_1^{14}, R_1^{19}, R_1^{29}, R_1^{30}, R_1^{32}, R_2^6, R_2^{11}, R_2^{18},$**

$R_2^{27}$  and  $R_2^{28}$ :

Set  $S_9(0) = 2^{15}, S_0(0) = \dots = S_8(0) = S_{10}(0) = \dots = S_{15}(0)=0$  and  $R_1(0) =$

$R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

$$(a) \ R_1(1)=0xCAC8723B, R_2(1)=0x3E553E55.$$

The location of the "1" bit in

$$R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e]})$$

corresponds to the position of  $R_1^1$  and it can be determined uniquely.

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|   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge (\overline{R_2(3)[1c]} \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(1)[2a])$     | $\implies R_2^1$    |
| $R_2(3)[1c] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a]} \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[2a])$         | $\implies R_2^2$    |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(2)[1b]} \vee R_2(5)[1e])$   | $\implies R_2^{12}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(3)[1c]} \vee R_2(4)[1d])$   | $\implies R_2^{13}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(4)[1d]})$ | $\implies R_2^{17}$ |
| $R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a]} \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(5)[1e])$     | $\implies R_2^{24}$ |
| $R_2(5)[1e] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a]} \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(4)[1d])$       | $\implies R_2^{25}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge (\overline{R_2(2)[1b]} \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[2a])$       | $\implies R_2^{26}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge (\overline{R_2(5)[1e]} \vee R_2(1)[2a])$   | $\implies R_2^{29}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge (\overline{R_2(4)[1d]} \vee R_2(1)[2a])$   | $\implies R_2^{30}$ |

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Table 5: Formulas used in step 2

Similarly, the location of the other bits can be determined as shown in Table 6.

4. **Determining the bit locations of  $R_1^2, R_1^7, R_1^8, R_1^9, R_1^{11}, R_1^{13}, R_1^{16}, R_1^{20}, R_1^{21}, R_1^{25}, R_1^{27},$**

**$R_2^3, R_2^8, R_2^9, R_2^{14}, R_2^{16}, R_2^{19}, R_2^{20}, R_2^{22}$  and  $R_2^{31}$ .**

Set  $S_5 = 2^{16} + 2^{18} + 2^{20} + 2^{21} = 0x00350000$ ,  $S_9 = 2^{16} + 2^{20} = 0x00110000$ ,  $S_j = 0$ ;  $\{j = 0 \dots 15, j \neq 5, 9\}$  and  $R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

(a)  $R_1(1) = 0xCF571B36$ ,  $R_2(1) = 0xC92206F5$ .

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|  |                     |
|--|---------------------|
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(5)[1e]}) \vee R_1(1)[3a]$    | $\implies R_1^3$    |
| $R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[2a]})$        | $\implies R_1^4$    |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e]})$    | $\implies R_1^{14}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{\vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[3a]})$ | $\implies R_1^{19}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[3a]})$  | $\implies R_1^{29}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{\vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[3a]})$ | $\implies R_1^{30}$ |
| $R_1(5)[1a] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(1)[2a]})$          | $\implies R_1^{32}$ |
| $R_2(5)[1a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[3a]})$            | $\implies R_2^6$    |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(5)[1e]})$    | $\implies R_2^{11}$ |
| $R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[3a]})$          | $\implies R_2^{18}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(5)[1e]})$  | $\implies R_2^{27}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(5)[1e]})$      | $\implies R_2^{28}$ |

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Table 6: Formulas used in step 3

The location of the "1" bit in

$$R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(1)[2a]})$$

corresponds to the position of  $R_1^2$  and it can be determined uniquely. Similarly, the other bits can be located as depicted in Table 7.

##### 5. Determining the bit locations of $R_1^5, R_1^{10}, R_1^{12}, R_1^{17}, R_2^4, R_2^5, R_2^{10}, R_2^{15}, R_2^{21}$ and $R_2^{23}$ :

Set  $S_5=0x011700000$ ,  $S_9=0x01110000$ ,  $Sj = 0; \{j = 0 \dots 15, j \neq 5, 9\}$  and

$R_1(0) = R_2(0) = 0$ . Then after 1 clock cycle we have:

(a)  $R_1(1) = 0x7D9C9DDD$ ,  $R_2(1) = 0x9E4C22CB$ .

Table 8 shows how the remaining bits can be located.

Note that the computations performed in this section can be performed simultaneously, i.e., in parallel, by observing the scan out results in section 5.4.3. In other words, these steps do not require any extra clocking for the circuit.

## 5.5 Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we presented a scan based side channel attack on ZUC. Our attack allows the cryptanalyst to determine the bit positions corresponding to the cipher secret internal state in the scan out chain. To do so, we first used the key loading procedure to determine the least and the most significant byte locations of the LFSR register. Then we utilized the working mode procedure to determine the positions corresponding to the remaining bits in the LFSR and the memory cells  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ .

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|   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[3a] \vee R_1(1)[4a]})$       | $\implies R_1^7$    |
| $R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[2a] \vee R_1(1)[3a] \vee R_1(1)[4a]})$         | $\implies R_1^8$    |
| $R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(1)[2a] \vee R_1(1)[3a]})$       | $\implies R_1^9$    |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(1)[3a] \vee R_1(1)[4a]})$       | $\implies R_1^{11}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge R_1(1)[4a]$            | $\implies R_1^{13}$ |
| $R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(1)[2a] \vee R_1(1)[3a] \vee R_1(1)[4a]})$       | $\implies R_1^{16}$ |
| $R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(1)[2a] \vee R_1(1)[4a]})$       | $\implies R_1^{20}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[3a]})$     | $\implies R_1^{21}$ |
| $R_1(3)[1c] \wedge R_1(4)[1d] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(1)[1a] \vee R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(1)[2a] \vee R_1(1)[3a]})$     | $\implies R_1^{25}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(1)[3a]})$     | $\implies R_1^{27}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge R_2(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(5)[1e]})$   | $\implies R_2^3$    |
| $R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[3a]})$       | $\implies R_2^8$    |
| $R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[3a] \vee R_2(1)[4a]})$         | $\implies R_2^9$    |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(2)[1b] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge \overline{R_2(1)[4a]}$ | $\implies R_2^{14}$ |
| $R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[3a] \vee R_2(1)[4a]})$         | $\implies R_2^{16}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[4a]})$     | $\implies R_2^{19}$ |
| $R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[3a] \vee R_2(1)[4a]})$         | $\implies R_2^{20}$ |
| $R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge R_2(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[3a]})$       | $\implies R_2^{22}$ |
| $R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(1)[2a] \wedge R_2(1)[4a] \wedge (\overline{R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[3a]})$       | $\implies R_2^{31}$ |

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Table 7: Formulas used in step 4

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|   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge R_1(1)[5a] \wedge \overline{(R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d])}$ | $\implies R_1^5$    |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(5)[1e] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[3a] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge \overline{(R_1(2)[1b] \vee R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(1)[5a])}$   | $\implies R_1^{10}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge R_1(1)[5a] \wedge \overline{(R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[4a])}$   | $\implies R_1^{12}$ |
| $R_1(1)[1a] \wedge R_1(2)[1b] \wedge R_1(1)[2a] \wedge R_1(1)[4a] \wedge \overline{(R_1(3)[1c] \vee R_1(4)[1d] \vee R_1(5)[1e] \vee R_1(1)[4a] \vee R_1(1)[5a])}$     | $\implies R_1^{17}$ |
| $R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[5a] \wedge \overline{(R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[3a] \vee R_2(1)[4a])}$         | $\implies R_2^4$    |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge R_2(1)[4a] \wedge \overline{(R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[5a])}$   | $\implies R_2^5$    |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(3)[1c] \wedge R_2(4)[1d] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge R_2(1)[4a] \wedge R_2(1)[5a] \wedge \overline{(R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[2a])}$ | $\implies R_2^{10}$ |
| $R_2(4)[1d] \wedge \overline{(R_2(1)[1a] \vee R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(5)[1e] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[3a] \vee R_2(1)[4a] \vee R_2(1)[5a])}$           | $\implies R_2^{15}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge \overline{(R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[4a] \vee R_2(1)[5a])}$       | $\implies R_2^{21}$ |
| $R_2(1)[1a] \wedge R_2(5)[1e] \wedge R_2(1)[3a] \wedge R_2(1)[5a] \wedge \overline{(R_2(2)[1b] \vee R_2(3)[1c] \vee R_2(4)[1d] \vee R_2(1)[2a] \vee R_2(1)[4a])}$     | $\implies R_2^{23}$ |

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Table 8: Formulas used in step 5



# Chapter 6

## Conclusions and Future Work

### 6.1 Summary

Throughout this work, we presented side channel cryptanalytic attacks against three symmetric key ciphers: (i) SOSEMANUK, which is a software-based stream cipher of the eSTREAM software portfolio, (ii) Hummingbird, which is a hybrid structure of block cipher and stream ciphers dedicated for ultra-lightweight encryption and (iii) ZUC, which is a new stream cipher proposed for the 4G mobile standard.

The overall complexity of our differential fault analysis attack against SOSEMANUK can be summarized as follows: The average number of faults required to perform the attack is  $4 \times 1536 = 6144$ . This fault injection phase requires the attacker to reinitialize the cipher for 6144 times. The attack requires work equivalent to around  $2^{48}$  iterations. The storage requirements amounts to  $2^{38.17}$  bytes.

Our attack against Hummingbird is inspired by the currently known attacks against

AES. However, unlike AES, the key schedule properties of Hummingbird cannot be utilized by the attacker to further reduce the complexity of the attack. This forces the attacker to iterate the fault injection on every round of the 16-bit block cipher algorithm to recover the whole key. Each 64-bit round key can be found, on average, using 12.51 faulty encryptions. If we assume that the 256-bit secret key and 80-bit internal state have random distribution, then the whole cipher can be broken after around 50 faults. To fully recover the key, we have to guess  $2^{48}$  values of three 16-bit internal state registers which brings the whole complexity of our attack to  $O(2^{68})$ .

Finally, we presented a scan based side channel attack against ZUC. Under reasonable assumptions, our cryptanalysis allows the attacker to ascertain the whole location of the internal registers of the LFSR and the memory cells. Consequently, this attack allows the cryptanalyst to efficiently recover the cipher secret internal state in a relatively small number of clock cycles.

## 6.2 Future work

When compared to other stream ciphers in the equivalent fault analysis model, DFA of SOSEMANUK requires a relatively smaller number of faults. For example, the DFA attack on RC4 given in [9] requires  $2^{16}$  faults in random locations of its inner state. Another DFA attack on HC-128 [10] requires around  $2^{13}$  faults in random locations. In future work, it will be interesting to see whether the number of faults for the DFA of SOSEMANUK and other stream ciphers can be drastically decreased in the assumed fault model.

A naive approach to prevent our attack is to use algorithm level redundancy and disable the device output if the two produced key stream values do not match. Another more efficient approach, which partially protects against fault attacks, is to add parity bits to all the inner state registers and disable the device output if any of these parity checks is violated. Efficient fault analysis resistant implementations for SOSEMANUK, as well as for other stream ciphers, need to be addressed in future research.

Another related research direction is the exploration of different side channel attacks against the SHA-3 finalist [93] when operating in the MAC mode.

Developing cryptosystems that are inherently secure against side channel attacks, by design, is also a very challenging research direction.

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